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ARTICLE

ADAPTABLE DUE PROCESS

JASON PARKIN

†

The requirements of procedural due process must adapt to our constantly
changing world. Over thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court in
Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge adopted what appears to be a
dynamic, fact-intensive approach to determining the procedures required by the
Due Process Clause. Federal, state, and local government agencies responded by
establishing new procedural safeguards, many of which are virtually identical
to those in use today. Yet, for public benefits programs such as welfare, the intervening decades have brought striking changes. The 1996 federal welfare law
created new and powerful incentives to trim the rolls. Work requirements increased the proportion of recipients holding jobs, forcing many to choose between
forgoing their due process rights and jeopardizing their employment by missing
work to attend a hearing. Technological advances enabled welfare agencies to
cut off benefits based on automated eligibility determinations that are difficult
for recipients to challenge. Cuts in funding for legal services made the prospect
of legal representation at fair hearings remote.
These new facts and circumstances undermine the effectiveness of existing
procedures and may require reweighing the Mathews factors to determine what
process is due to welfare recipients. Such changes are not unique to welfare; the
facts and circumstances relevant to many of the procedural safeguards estab†

Robert M. Cover Fellow, Yale Law School; Assistant Professor of Law Designate,
Pace University School of Law. The author appreciates the insightful comments of
David Super, Muneer Ahmad, Sameer Ashar, Ian Ayres, Molly Biklen, Ray Brescia,
Philip Genty, Robin Golden, Annie Lai, Jerry Mashaw, Judith Resnik, Jeff Selbin, Jane
Greengold Stevens, Peter Strauss, Susan Sturm, Michael Wishnie, Stephen Wizner,
Noah Zatz, Mary Marsh Zulack, and participants at the 2011 Clinical Law Review Writers’
Workshop at the New York University School of Law, as well as the expert editing of
Elizabeth Feldmeier Vieyra, Yiyang Wu, Cory Brader, and the staff of the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review.

(1309)

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2052479

Parkin FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

1310

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

4/10/2012 5:59 PM

[Vol. 160: 1309

lished since the due process revolution will evolve in the years to come, if they
have not already. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether or
how existing procedures should be adapted to such changes, adapting the demands of due process to new facts and circumstances is faithful to constitutional
doctrine and necessary to ensure that existing procedures continue to provide
due process of law. It also provides an opportunity to reinvigorate a conversation about procedural justice that went silent many years ago.
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INTRODUCTION
Will due process keep up with our rapidly changing world? Can
procedures that satisfied due process at one point in time become
unconstitutional when the facts and circumstances change? The answer would seem to be yes. As the Supreme Court has emphasized in
case after case, “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
1
protections as the particular situation demands.” Yet, in the thirty-five
years since adopting a fact-intensive balancing approach to procedural
2
due process in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court has not assessed whether
changed circumstances can render unconstitutional a set of procedural
protections that it previously held to satisfy the dictates of due process.
Whether the Mathews approach can account for changes over time
is not a mere footnote to the due process guarantee contained in the
3
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The world has
1

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). As the Court explained in
Morrissey, this proposition “has been said so often by this Court and others as not to
require citation of authority.” Id. The Court has quoted this langugage in numerous
decisions since Morrissey. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005); Gilbert
v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S.
1, 15 n.15 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); see also Connecticut v.
Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (“[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“The very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.”).
2
424 U.S. at 334-35. In Mathews, the Court held that three factors must be
considered when determining the “specific dictates” of due process: (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
3
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law” either by the states (through the Fourteenth Amendment) or by the
federal government (through the Fifth Amendment). U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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changed in ways unimaginable to the judges, government officials, and
advocates responsible for shaping the procedural protections currently
in place, and the future is certain to bring changes of unforeseeable
variety and magnitude. Unless existing procedural safeguards are
adapted to whatever changes the future will bring, individuals facing
governmental deprivations will be threatened with violations of their
right to due process of law.
An example spanning twenty-three years, three federal lawsuits, and
the evolution of one state’s debt collection procedures reveals what can
be at stake when courts consider the adaptability of due process:
In July 1983, Cynthia McCahey, a mother of three children and a
recipient of welfare benefits, discovered that her checking account
4
had been frozen pursuant to New York’s debt collection procedures.
McCahey’s account was frozen even though it contained only her welfare benefits, which state law exempted from seizure by debt collec5
tors. Left with only post-seizure remedies, McCahey was not able to
6
regain access to her account until four-and-a-half months had passed.
During that time, “she fell behind in her rent and utility payments”
7
and “skimped on food and clothing” for her family.
McCahey brought suit in federal court arguing that New York’s
debt collection procedures violated due process because they lacked
pre-seizure procedural protections. The case reached the Second
Circuit, which applied the Mathews balancing test to the freezing of
bank accounts that contained only money exempt from seizure and
concluded that New York’s procedures struck “a fair balance between
8
the competing interests” and therefore satisfied due process. The
pre-seizure process sought by McCahey was not mandated by due
process, the court explained, because of the risk that debtors would
9
conceal assets. As a result of the McCahey decision, recipients of sub-

4

McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1985).
See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 137 (McKinney 2003) (“All moneys or orders granted
to persons as public assistance . . . shall be inalienable by any assignment or transfer
and shall be exempt from levy and execution under the laws of this state.”).
6
McCahey, 774 F.2d at 546.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 549-50. According to the Second Circuit, New York’s procedures satisfied
due process because they provided debtors with post-seizure notice including, notice of
exemptions to which they may be entitled, and a prompt opportunity to challenge the
seizure and assert their exemptions. Id. at 549 (citing Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534
F. Supp. 1178, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
9
Id. at 550.
5
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sistence benefits were left with no choice but to wait until their money
was seized before trying to reclaim it, even though state law exempted
the funds from ever being seized in the first place.
Seventeen years later, on October 27, 2000, Bernie Huggins’s bank
account was frozen pursuant to the same debt collection procedures
10
held to be constitutional in McCahey. The only funds in Huggins’s
11
account were his monthly Social Security disability benefits, which,
12
like McCahey’s welfare benefits, were exempt from seizure. Huggins
brought a federal lawsuit claiming that New York’s procedures violated
due process. Not surprisingly, the defendants immediately moved to
dismiss the case, arguing that McCahey controlled and that Huggins’s
13
due process claim failed as a matter of law.
Huggins contended that McCahey was not dispositive because the
facts and circumstances had changed in ways that altered the Mathews
14
balancing undertaken by the Second Circuit in 1985. Unlike the
paper welfare checks deposited by McCahey, Huggins’s benefits were
deposited directly into his bank account and electronically tagged in a
15
manner that clearly identified the funds as disability benefits. According to Huggins, this shift tipped the balance in favor of an additional procedural safeguard: requiring the bank to determine whether
an account contained electronically deposited exempt benefits before
16
freezing it. Tracing the source of funds in a bank account would
have been overly burdensome in 1985, but Huggins argued that the
advent of direct deposit enabled banks to quickly and easily determine
if an account contained only exempt money.
The district court refused to reevaluate the Mathews factors in light
17
of the changed circumstances. Although it acknowledged that Huggins raised “valid concerns about the advisability” of the challenged procedures and that the Second Circuit “may be inclined to reconsider”
10

Huggins v. Pataki, No. 01-CV-3016, 2002 WL 1732804, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002).
Id. In fact, Huggins maintained the account solely for the purpose of receiving his
disability benefits via electronic transfer from the Social Security Administration. Id.
12
See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006) (“[N]one of the moneys paid or payable or rights
existing under this subchapter [Social Security benefits] shall be subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law.”).
13
Huggins, 2002 WL 1732804, at *3.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at *4.
11
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McCahey, the court concluded that “McCahey is binding authority, and I
18
am obliged to apply that authority.” Huggins appealed to the Second
Circuit, but he died before oral argument and the case was dismissed
19
on August 18, 2003.
The issue did not stay out of the courts for long. On November 19,
2003, Dennis Mayers brought another challenge to the law, making
20
virtually the same argument as Huggins.
Mayers, who was later
21
joined by two other plaintiffs, filed his case in the same courthouse
where Huggins’s case was heard, but it was assigned to a different
district judge. This time, the district court held that McCahey did not
22
mandate dismissal.
Invoking the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that due process “is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
23
place, and circumstances,” the district court took up the Mathews balancing anew and concluded that the procedures approved by McCahey
no longer satisfied due process in light of subsequent technological
24
and policy developments. In particular, the court emphasized that
the additional procedural safeguard sought by the plaintiffs—
requiring banks to determine, prior to freezing an account, that the
account does not contain only electronically deposited exempt
18

Id. The court also presciently remarked that “[p]erhaps arguments directed to
the state legislature will produce a change in the law.” Id.
19
Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, Huggins v. Pataki, No. 02-7950 (2d Cir. Aug.
18, 2003).
20
Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. 03-CV-5837, 2005 WL 2105810, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005). Mayers’s bank account contained his Social Security
disability benefits, which were exempt from seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). Id.
at *2-3. In the interest of full disclosure, I was one of the attorneys representing the
plaintiffs in Mayers.
21
The two additional plaintiffs were Nancy Ciccone and Elba Quinones, both of
whom had their bank accounts frozen even though those accounts contained only
benefits that were exempt from seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). Mayers, 2005
WL 2105810, at *3-4.
22
Id. at *12-13.
23
Id. at *13 (quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991)).
24
Id. at *14. As to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the
court found that two post-McCahey changes increased the potential for risk: the Social
Security Administration’s 1998 requirement that benefit recipients receive payments
electronically, and technological developments that made it easier for creditors to serve
restraining notices on banks. Id. at *13-14. As to the third Mathews factor, the
government’s interest, the court found that the additional procedural protections
sought by the plaintiffs implicated the government’s interest because the procedures
would reduce the number of costly proceedings initiated in state court and “promote a
more efficient use of judicial resources.” Id. at *14.
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funds—would impose only a “negligible” cost relative to the benefit it
25
would produce. The case proceeded in the district court until November 26, 2008, when it was mooted by statutory amendments to New
York’s debt collection procedures that effectively prevented banks
26
from freezing accounts containing only exempt funds.
The McCahey-Huggins-Mayers example involves a narrow issue arising out of one state’s debt collection procedures, but it exposes important questions about the adaptability of due process. What types of
changes can undermine the constitutionality of procedures previously
deemed to satisfy due process? How should courts respond to claims
that new facts and new circumstances affect the constitutionality of
existing procedures? As the Huggins and Mayers decisions demonstrate, judges considering identical due process claims based on identical facts can arrive at conflicting answers, with very different
consequences for the individuals and government agencies whose interests are under consideration.
*

*

*

This Article examines the adaptability of due process through the
lens of the most commonly used—and perhaps the most iconic—
procedural safeguard in existence today: the right to a fair hearing.
Since 1970, when the Supreme Court ruled in Goldberg v. Kelly that welfare recipients must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard at
27
a fair hearing prior to termination of their benefits, the right to a fair
hearing has served as the central element of due process when an individual’s eligibility for public benefits is at issue. Indeed, in the years
following Goldberg, federal, state, and local agencies established fair
hearing systems for a wide range of public benefits in addition to wel28
29
fare, including food stamps, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security

25

Id. at *13.
See Exempt Income Protection Act of 2008, § 3, 2008 N.Y. Laws 4085, 4088
(codified as amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5222(h) (MCKINNEY Supp. 2012)) (directing
that “if direct deposit or electronic payments [are] reasonably identifiable as statutorily
exempt payments,” then banks shall not restrain $2500 in the account, and if there is
less than $2500 in the account, the “account shall not be restrained” at all).
27
397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
28
See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (2006) (establishing a right to a fair hearing to
challenge adverse food stamp eligibility determinations); 7 C.F.R. § 273.15 (2011)
(detailing the food stamp program’s fair hearing mandate).
26
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31

Income, among others. For the millions of individuals who have
received public benefits since the 1970s, the fair hearing system established in the wake of Goldberg and Mathews represents the real-world
legacy of the Supreme Court’s due process revolution.
The emergence of the right to a fair hearing effectively halted further evolution of what a public benefits recipient’s “opportunity to be
heard” entails. Today, decades after Goldberg, the fair hearings available to public benefits recipients look almost identical to those put into
32
place in the 1970s. Not all aspects of public benefits programs have
remained frozen in time, of course. But even where the statutes and
regulations underlying a benefits program have been radically altered
or simply discarded and rewritten—as was the case with the 1996 fed33
eral welfare law —the procedures for challenging terminations of
those benefits remain virtually indistinguishable from those put into
place many years ago.
Scholarly interest in the due process rights of public benefits recipients has followed a similar arc over the past forty years. After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg, procedural due process and the
right to a fair hearing captured the attention of scholars of constitutional law, administrative law, and the then-emerging field of poverty
law. The years between Goldberg and Mathews saw lively debates
over which administrative procedures satisfied due process, while
post-Mathews the conversation turned toward critiques of the Mathews
34
approach and the procedures it required. This spike in interest sub29

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (mandating state provision of “an opportunity for a
fair hearing . . . to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is
denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness”); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.220–.223
(detailing the right to a hearing).
30
See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (establishing a right to a fair hearing to challenge benefit
eligibility or amount determinations “in whole or in part unfavorable” to the
applicant); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1429–416.1461 (detailing the hearing process).
31
Other public benefits programs with fair hearing requirements include the
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) supplemental nutrition program. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1786(f)(8)(a) (granting fair hearing rights to aggrieved parties); 7 C.F.R. § 246.9
(describing the hearing right).
32
Although the contours of “the opportunity to be heard” have remained fixed for
public benefits recipients since Goldberg, other aspects of recipients’ due process rights
continued to evolve during the 1970s and early 1980s. See infra note 116.
33
In the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended primarily in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), lawmakers brushed aside the existing welfare law and
replaced it with an entirely new program. See infra Section II.A.
34
See infra Section I.C.
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sided in the 1980s: having registered their views on Goldberg’s fair
hearing right and Mathews’s cost-benefit approach to procedural due
process, legal academics shifted their focus elsewhere as this intersection of constitutional law and administrative procedure was no longer
undergoing the dramatic developments of the prior decade.
With a stable legal doctrine, an ossified set of procedural protections, and a lack of recent attention from legal scholars, it might appear that there is little left to say about procedural due process and the
right to a fair hearing. Yet public benefits programs have evolved in
unanticipated ways since the Supreme Court ruled on the due process
35
rights of welfare recipients decades ago. The 1996 federal welfare
law fundamentally altered the administration of welfare, introducing
strong incentives to trim the rolls, a new emphasis on discretionary
36
decisionmaking, and new opportunities for privatization. Technological advances have enabled welfare agencies to process applications
and issue benefits more quickly, while at the same time increased reliance on automation has led to erroneous terminations that are diffi37
Welfare work requirements have increased the
cult to challenge.
proportion of recipients holding jobs while collecting benefits, forcing
many to choose between forgoing their due process rights and potentially jeopardizing their employment by missing work to appear at a
38
hearing. Cuts in funding for legal services have made the prospect of
39
free legal representation at fair hearings remote. By undermining
many of the factual assumptions that originally justified the right to a
fair hearing, these changes in the facts and circumstances of welfare
programs and welfare recipients have increased the risk that benefits
will be erroneously terminated.
This Article argues that the demands of due process must adapt to
changing facts and circumstances. Importantly, I do not suggest that
the Mathews approach be abandoned in favor of some other method of
determining whether specific procedures satisfy due process of law.
Numerous scholars have proposed alternatives to the Mathews approach,
40
and many of those proposals remain compelling today. Instead, by
examining changes in the context of welfare, this Article considers
35
36
37
38
39
40

See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra subsection II.B.1.
See infra subsection II.B.2.
See infra Section I.C.
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when such changes require a reweighing of the Mathews factors, which
in turn may result in due process dictating a different set of procedures.
The notion that changes in facts and circumstances could require
reevaluation of the Mathews factors may seem obvious, but the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed whether or how such a reevaluation
should take place. Nor have legal scholars examined how to apply
Mathews when procedures that once satisfied due process may no longer
do so. It is almost as if a procedural regime that has been established in
accordance with Mathews is considered final and no longer worthy of
constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, aside from the Huggins and Mayers decisions discussed above, due process challenges based on changing facts
and circumstances appear to be absent from the post-Mathews case law.
This Article’s examination of the adaptability of procedural due
process provides an essential supplement to the due process analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in Mathews. By identifying changes
relevant to the due process calculation and by providing a doctrinal
basis for taking these changes into account when determining whether
existing procedures continue to satisfy due process, this Article outlines an approach to procedural due process that is faithful to current
doctrine and adaptable to changes that arise in the years and decades
after a procedural system is put into place.
Part I of this Article outlines the current state of procedural due
process doctrine and the right to a fair hearing. It begins by providing
an overview of the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence as it
relates to government benefits programs, with a focus on the due process revolution of the 1970s and the Court’s decisions in Goldberg and
Mathews. It then explains how local, state, and federal agencies responded to these doctrinal developments, with particular emphasis on
the evolution of the welfare fair hearing system. Finally, Part I reviews
the scholarly critiques of Goldberg’s right to a fair hearing and Mathews’s
cost-benefit approach to procedural due process, as well as recent legal
scholarship on procedural due process in the administrative state.
Part II identifies aspects of welfare that have undergone significant
changes since the Supreme Court established the right to a fair hearing in 1970. This Part examines (1) changes in incentives to terminate
benefits, including new funding mechanisms, shifts toward discretionary decisionmaking, and the rise of privatization; (2) changes in the
circumstances of welfare recipients, including the increased proportion of recipients holding jobs while collecting benefits and the
decreased availability of legal representation at fair hearings; and

Parkin FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/10/2012 5:59 PM

Adaptable Due Process

1319

(3) changes in technology, including the rise of automated eligibility
determinations and computerized case management systems. For each
of these categories, the changes represent a significant departure from
the facts and circumstances in existence (or understood to be in existence) in the 1970s, and those changes have created procedural needs
that did not exist when Goldberg was decided. Furthermore, because
these changes affect one or more of the Mathews factors, they call into
question whether the procedural safeguard demanded by due process
in 1970—the right to a fair hearing—continues to satisfy due
process today.
Part III explores how courts should respond to claims that changing facts and circumstances undermine the constitutionality of procedural safeguards previously deemed to satisfy due process. After
noting the lack of clear precedent on this point, this Part revisits the
McCahey-Huggins-Mayers example and identifies different paths that
could be taken in response to such challenges. Then, through a close
examination of the Supreme Court’s procedural due process case law,
this Part argues that an approach to procedural due process that accounts for new facts and circumstances is faithful to established doctrine. Returning to the welfare context, this Part identifies procedural
innovations that respond to the new needs of welfare recipients identified in Part II. This Part then considers the limits of the right to a fair
hearing and suggests alternative approaches to achieving procedural
fairness in the administration of welfare programs. I conclude by arguing that adapting the demands of due process to changing facts and
circumstances is not only necessary to ensure that existing procedures
continue to withstand constitutional scrutiny, but it also provides an
opportunity, four decades after the due process revolution, to reinvigorate procedural due process for a rapidly changing world.
I. FROM REVOLUTION TO STAGNATION: GOLDBERG, MATHEWS,
AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING
Two Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s altered the reach and
requirements of due process in fundamental ways. In Goldberg v. Kelly,
the Court expanded the scope of what counts as “property” under the
Due Process Clause and held that welfare recipients have a right to a
41
fair hearing before the government terminates their welfare benefits.
41

See 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970); see also id. at 264 (“[O]nly a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process.”).
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Goldberg touched off a “due process explosion” in which procedural
due process requirements were extended to cover many types of gov42
ernment action unrelated to welfare terminations. Then, six years
after deciding Goldberg, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge adopted what
remains the general approach for determining what process is due
when the government seeks to deprive an individual of a constitution43
ally protected interest.
This Part outlines the current state of procedural due process and
the right to a welfare fair hearing. Beginning with the Court’s decisions
in Goldberg and Mathews, it traces the evolution of due process doctrine
in the context of welfare terminations. It then explains how local, state,
and federal agencies responded to these doctrinal developments, with
particular emphasis on the evolution of the welfare fair hearing system.
Finally, this Part reviews the scholarly critiques of Goldberg, Mathews,
and the right to a fair hearing, as well as the more recent legal scholarship on procedural due process in the administrative state.
A. Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge
The due process revolution of the 1970s began with the Supreme
44
Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly. With Justice Brennan writing for
the seven-member majority, the Court first held that welfare benefits
45
are a form of property subject to due process protections. This hold-

42

Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975);
see also id. (“[T]he Court has carried the hearing requirement from one new area of
government action to another.”). This explosion led to a sharp increase in due process
litigation. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 9-10
(1985) (noting that “federal court complaints of procedural due process deprivation in
the 1970s showed a 350 percent increase over the 1960s,” compared to a seventy
percent increase in federal civil litigation of all kinds).
43
See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (listing three factors to be considered in deciding
what due process requires in a given situation).
44
See MASHAW, supra note 42, at 33 (“[B]y most accounts the due process
revolution began with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly . . . .”).
45
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. In reaching this conclusion, the Court invoked the
concept of “new property.” See id. at 262 n.8 (advocating recognition of “welfare
entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity’” despite the fact that they “do not
fall within traditional common-law concepts of property” (citing Charles A. Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255
(1965))); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)). The idea that
welfare recipients have a “right” to benefits was initially promoted by social workers and
lawyers working within the federal social welfare bureaucracy in the years immediately
following passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. See Karen M. Tani, Welfare and
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ing represented a significant expansion of the definition of “property,”
46
as that term is used in the Constitution. Goldberg thus provided support for extending due process protections previously afforded only
to deprivations of traditional forms of property to many other gov47
ernmental actions.
After ruling that welfare was a constitutionally protected property
interest, the Court proceeded to hold that recipients are entitled to a
48
hearing before, not after, their benefits are terminated. The Court
justified its demand for pretermination procedures by highlighting the
49
50
importance of welfare benefits to recipients and to society at large.
Turning to the contours of the hearing, the Court emphasized that the
procedures must be “adapted to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients, and to the limited nature of the controversies to be
51
resolved,” and that the hearing “must be tailored to the capacities
52
and circumstances of those who are to be heard.” Mindful of these
considerations, the Court held that, in the welfare context, due pro-

Rights Before the Movement: Rights as Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2012) (manuscript at 17-25) (on file with author).
46
Although the government defendant and the United States as amicus did not
dispute that due process applied in Goldberg, “because Justice Brennan goes beyond the
parties’ concession to explain why due process applies to welfare termination, the
opinion is now read as setting the Court on the path of modern due process doctrine.”
PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 791 (10th ed. rev. 2003).
47
See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Albert H. Meyerhoff & Jeffrey A.
Mishkin, Application of Goldberg v. Kelly Hearing Requirements to Termination of Social
Security Benefits, 26 STAN. L. REV. 549, 550-51 (1974) (“Once [due process]
protections . . . were extended to the deprivation of welfare benefits, there were
other obvious targets.”).
48
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
49
According to the Court, the “crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination
of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible
recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.” Id. at 264. The Court
recognized that “welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing,
and medical care.” Id. (footnote omitted). It further noted that without benefits, a
recipient must “concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, [which]
adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
50
The Court explained that uninterrupted provision of welfare benefits to eligible
recipients serves important governmental interests, including enabling the poor “to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community” and guarding against “the
societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and
insecurity.” Id. at 265.
51
Id. at 267.
52
Id. at 268-69 (footnote omitted).
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cess requires a pretermination hearing consisting of the following minimum procedural safeguards: notice detailing the reasons for the
53
proposed termination; the opportunity at the hearing to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, to present oral arguments, and to be rep54
55
resented by counsel; and adjudication by an impartial decisionmaker.
Six years after Goldberg, the Court decided a case that looked in
many respects quite similar. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the plaintiff relied
on Goldberg’s pretermination hearing requirement to argue that the
discontinuation of his Social Security disability benefits without a
56
pretermination hearing violated the Due Process Clause. The Court
rejected the claim, distinguishing disability benefits from welfare benefits and holding that the post-deprivation procedures available to re57
cipients of disability benefits were sufficient to satisfy due process.
In reaching its holding in Mathews, the Court adopted a new approach to determining what procedures are required by the Due Process Clause when the government seeks to deprive an individual of a
constitutionally protected interest:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re58
quirement would entail.

The Mathews Court’s cost-benefit approach to procedural due
process represented a significant departure from the analysis used in
Goldberg. Yet Mathews left untouched Goldberg’s central holding, and it
quoted with approval Goldberg’s view that procedures must be “tailored . . . to ‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard,’ to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to pre-

53

Id.
Id. at 269-70.
55
Id. at 271.
56
424 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1976).
57
The Court identified the following differences as relevant to its determination:
eligibility for disability benefits is not based upon financial need, id. at 340; other forms
of government assistance are available when the termination of disability benefits
places an individual or his family below the subsistence level, id. at 342; and the risk of
error is substantially lower than in the welfare context, id. at 344-45.
58
Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-71).
54
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59

sent their case.” And despite fears that the Mathews decision laid the
foundation for a disavowal of Goldberg’s right to a pretermination fair
hearing, the Court has continued to cite Goldberg in decisions involving
60
due process claims.
B. Implementation of the Due Process Revolution and
the Right to a Fair Hearing
In response to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Goldberg and
Mathews, federal, state, and local administrative agencies adjusted
existing procedures and created new ones in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. In the context of welfare benefits, agencies adopted procedures matching those articulated in Goldberg. For
other types of property interests, agencies looked to Goldberg, and later
to Mathews, to design the requisite procedural safeguards. The hallmark of those procedures was the fair hearing.
Government agencies were not altogether unfamiliar with fair hearings prior to Goldberg. Indeed, some public benefits programs made
hearings available to individuals challenging benefit terminations well
61
before Goldberg. The Social Security Act of 1935 included a provision
requiring states to offer hearings to beneficiaries of Aid to Dependent
62
63
Children (later renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children ).
Congress included similarly worded hearing requirements when it

59

Id. at 349 (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268-69).
See, for example, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 60 (1999), which cites both Goldberg and Mathews in determining whether an
individual has a property interest in state medical benefits.
61
See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1191 (2000) (“[T]he idea of using
hearings in public benefit programs as a means of correcting errors in individual cases
long predates the decision in [Goldberg].”).
62
See Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 402(a)(4), 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935) (repealed 1996)
(requiring that state plans for the Aid to Dependent Children program to “provide for
granting to any individual, whose claim with respect to aid to a dependent child is
denied, an opportunity for a fair hearing before such State agency”); see also A.
Delafield Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 266, 268 (1949)
(“All three of the federal [public assistance] titles require the state, as one of the
conditions of the federal grants, to give the applicant the opportunity of a fair hearing
before the state administrative agency.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally Tani, supra
note 45 (manuscript at 21-25) (describing discussions during 1935 and 1936 among
lawyers working within the federal social welfare bureaucracy concerning the meaning of
the Social Security Act’s fair hearing provision).
63
See infra note 124.
60
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64

established the Medicaid program in 1965 and modified the food
65
stamp program in 1977. Yet public benefits recipients rarely requested
66
fair hearings until the late 1960s, when hearings became a focal point
for the nascent welfare rights organizing movement and federally
funded legal services attorneys began representing significant num67
bers of welfare applicants and recipients.
The welfare fair hearing systems that arose during the 1970s hewed
68
closely to the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Goldberg.
64

See Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79
Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (Supp. III 2010))
(requiring that state plans for medical assistance “provide for granting an opportunity
for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical
assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness”).
65
See Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 11(e)(10), 91 Stat. 913, 972
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (2006)) (requiring that a state plan of
operation provide for a “fair hearing and prompt determination thereafter to any
household aggrieved by the action of the State agency”).
66
See FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND
POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 70 (2007) (“Fair hearings were rarely used by clients of
public assistance in the thirty years after passage of the Social Security Act.”); FRANCES
FOX PIVEN & R ICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF
PUBLIC WELFARE 173 (2d ed. 1993) (“In 1964, when the over-all welfare rolls stood at
about 500,000 persons in New York City, a mere fifteen appeals were taken in an entire
year.”); see also William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1857 (2001) (noting that the fair hearing
provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 “had been dormant for the Act’s first thirty
years”); Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement After Welfare Reform: Are Fair Hearings the
Cure?, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 13, 31-32 (2005) (discussing the extremely
limited use of fair hearings prior to Goldberg).
67
See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 73 (stating that in the mid-1960s, “[f]air
hearings became an integral part of the strategy of the [New York City] and national
welfare rights movements”). The number of fair hearings held per year in New York
State reflects the growing use of fair hearings. There were 188 fair hearings in New
York State in 1964, that number rose to 650 in 1966, and 4233 in 1967, when
requesting fair hearings became a central element of the welfare rights strategy in New
York City. Id.
68
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Reality of Procedural Due Process—A Study of the
Implementation of Fair Hearing Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 725, 733 (1972) (explaining that the federal hearing requirements adopted
shortly after Goldberg “incorporate[d] the Goldberg guidelines by providing the claimant
with the opportunity to present his position orally, to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, [and] to be represented by counsel or other spokesmen,” and also
established “the necessity for an impartial decision maker” (footnotes omitted)); see also
Cesar A. Perales, The Fair Hearings Process: Guardian of the Social Service System, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 889, 889-96 (1990) (discussing New York State’s implementation of
Goldberg’s fair hearing requirement). But see DANIEL J. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY
AND MASS ADMINISTRATIVE J USTICE 18-23 (1974) (noting that some jurisdictions
resisted the new fair hearing requirements).
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The hearings were adversarial and were presided over by an impartial
decisionmaker. Both welfare recipients and representatives of the welfare agency had the opportunity to present documentary and testimonial evidence. Judges based their decisions on the record created at
the hearing. Fair hearings therefore resembled mini-trials, with a written decision that parties typically could appeal to some higher level of
authority.
Goldberg’s influence extended well beyond welfare fair hearings, as
its rationale for classifying welfare benefits as a property right was ex69
tended to other benefits conferred by the government. Thus, a wide
range of benefits programs administered by federal, state, and local
agencies were understood to be “new property” and subject to Gold70
berg’s fair hearing requirement. Some statutory and administrative
regimes even mandated fair hearing–like procedures in areas where
71
due process may not have required them to do so.
So too has Mathews had an impact far beyond the narrow question
presented in that case. According to the Supreme Court, Mathews
offers “a general approach” for testing challenged procedures under a
72
due process claim. The Court has subsequently applied Mathews’s
three-factor analysis in a variety of contexts unrelated to public bene69

See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1977-78 (1996) (“In a single opinion the Court transformed
welfare, and potentially all other forms of government benefits, from a mere privilege
completely unprotected by due process to a property right subject to the most stringent
procedural safeguards available in the United States legal system.”).
70
See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY,
BUREAUCRACY 21 (1986) (“Goldberg v. Kelly struck a responsive chord and was picked
up in many statutory and administrative schemes—welfare, Social Security, disability,
mental health, education.”); see also supra notes 28-31.
71
See, e.g., Diller, supra note 61, at 1191 (“The reliance on hearings is so ingrained
that Congress has provided for pretermination hearings even in situations in which the
Court has concluded that they are not required by due process.”). For example,
“Congress provided for [a right to a pretermination hearing] in the context of Social
Security disability benefits, even though the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge held that the
Due Process Clause did not prohibit the Social Security Administration from
terminating benefits prior to holding a hearing.” Id. at 1191 n.365 (citations omitted);
cf. HANDLER, supra note 70, at 21 (“Many areas of relationships between clients and
agencies are governed by statutory and administrative procedural schemes that were
adopted during the Goldberg v. Kelly era, but are now no longer constitutionally
required.”).
72
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979). But cf. Dusenbery v. United States, 534
U.S. 161, 167-68 (2002) (declining to use the Mathews approach to evaluate a due
process challenge to the adequacy of a method of giving notice, and observing that “we
have never viewed Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due
process claims”).
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fits terminations, including terminations of parental rights, involun74
75
tary civil commitments to mental hospitals, civil forfeitures, deten76
tion of citizens as enemy combatants, immigration deportation
77
78
proceedings, and terminations of public employment. The Court
has even used the Mathews balancing approach to analyze claims under
79
the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.
C. Praise and Criticism of the Right to a Fair Hearing
While federal, state, and local agencies assessed their obligations
under the Court’s evolving understanding of procedural due process,
legal scholars began to consider the changes to due process doctrine
ushered in by Goldberg and Mathews. Between 1970 and 1990, scholars
of constitutional, administrative, and poverty law explored many aspects of Goldberg’s right to a fair hearing, including its effect on the
welfare rights movement, its ability to protect individual rights, and its
capacity to change the behavior of welfare agencies and caseworkers.
This debate over procedural justice remains relevant today.
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to a fair hearing was
initially hailed as a major victory for welfare recipients and the welfare
80
rights movement. Securing the right to a pretermination fair hearing
was an important element of the organizing campaign around poverty
81
issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At its most basic level, the
fair hearing right provided protection for claimants who talked back to

73

See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-68 (1982).
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979).
75
See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53-61 (1993).
76
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-35 (2004).
77
See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-37 (1982).
78
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543-45 (1985).
79
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781-82 (2008).
80
See, e.g., Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare (characterizing Goldberg as the
“leading judicial advance with regard to welfare procedures,” and explaining that
“Goldberg can be a major tool in aiding organized recipients to deal boldly with the
welfare departments without fear (or with less fear) of retaliation by cutoff”), in THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE—WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 63, 71-72
(Norman Dorsen ed., 1971).
81
Taking the Goldberg case to the Supreme Court was “part and parcel of the
organizing strategy of the welfare rights movement, designed to amplify the organized
forces—particularly the organized welfare recipient forces—of the movement.” Ed
Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly
Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 562 (1984) (emphasis
omitted).
74
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82

and resisted welfare caseworkers. Many in the movement also believed that fair hearings would be a pressure point for securing more
generous benefits and a stronger safety net for low-income individuals
83
and communities. According to historian Felicia Kornbluh, “[F]air
hearings were a form of ‘legal civil disobedience,’ which was safer than
84
a public sit-in or a march on the state welfare office.”
On an individual level, the Court’s fair hearing requirement
marked a shift in the manner in which many welfare recipients interacted with the government and the legal system. As Sylvia Law observed, poor people in the 1960s not only had “no process . . . but, in a
85
fundamental sense, they had no law.” Goldberg altered this dynamic.
Fair hearings enabled welfare recipients to have their demands for
material aid taken seriously, to claim standing in the legal and political
life of the postwar United States, and to force their caseworkers to
86
listen. By allowing welfare recipients to challenge the evidence pre82

See id. at 563 (“[T]he particular legal right involved a recognition of the fundamental
human right of the recipient to dissent and resist . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
83
See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 70-87 (describing how fair hearings can “help
resource-poor social movement groups” and allow “participat[ion] in a respectful
public forum”). However, any hope that the legal system could help recipients obtain
more generous benefits was dashed two weeks after Goldberg was decided, when the
Court handed down its decision in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
According to the Court:
[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.
The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of
welfare administration. But the Constitution does not empower this Court to
second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating
limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.
Id. at 487 (internal citations omitted); see also Forbath, supra note 66, at 1867 (“[I]n
Dandridge v. Williams, the Court made plain that generous, justice-seeking statutory
constructions and formal and procedural protections were as far as it would go in
‘promoting the general Welfare’ with welfare rights . . . .”).
84
KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 66. The fair hearing strategy, and the welfare
rights movement in general, faded by the early 1970s, when “[t]he rising conservative
and antiwelfare mood called into question the idea that poor people could gain justice
and protect their ‘human rights’ by going to court.” Id. at 175; see also id. at 174
(explaining that by the mid-1970s, “women and men who participated in welfare rights
battles were increasingly conscious of the weaknesses of legal strategies such as fair
hearings”).
85
Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 805, 806 (1990).
86
See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 76 (“When they sought and pursued fair
hearings, welfare recipients expressed their desires for material aid and for recognition
as members of the society in which they lived.” (citing Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution
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sented by the government and to produce their own evidence to oppose the termination of benefits, fair hearings provided an opportunity for recipients to participate in the decisionmaking process in a way
87
that was not previously available. Moreover, requiring a government
agency to prove its case before terminating a recipient’s benefits
88
showed respect for the humanity and dignity of welfare recipients.

to Recognition?: Dilemmas of Justice in a “Postsocialist” Age, in JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS:
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST” CONDITION 11, 39 (1997))); David
J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 288 (1998)
(“For many benefit recipients, the fair hearing is the only time their claim is treated
with any seriousness by any state official.”); cf. KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 79 (“The
fair hearing campaign gave many poor people a taste of the negotiating power that
wealthier individuals typically gained from raising the threat of litigation and settling
their cases without going to court.”).
87
See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 80 (explaining that fair hearings created an
opportunity for individual recipients to “participate in a respectful public forum that
recognized their rights”). Many scholars have argued that fair hearings provide a
valuable opportunity to participate in administrative decisionmaking. See, e.g., Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885,
888-93 (1981) (emphasizing the importance of an individual’s right to participate in
decisions affecting her in important ways); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational
Aims in Procedural Due Process (explaining the importance of “process values” such as
participation in administrative decisionmaking), in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 126,
127-28 ( J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977); Richard B. Saphire,
Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 148-51 (1978) (suggesting a process evaluation method that
would grant independent significance to due process itself); Robert S. Summers,
Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 13 (1974) (noting that legal processes should be evaluated for such factors as
“process value efficacy” in addition to “good result efficacy”).
As Frank Michelman has explained:
The individual may have various reasons for wanting an opportunity to discuss
the decision with the agent. Some pertain to external consequences: the individual might succeed in persuading the agent away from the harmful action.
But again a participatory opportunity may also be psychologically important to
the individual: to have played a part in, to have made one’s apt contribution
to, decisions which are about oneself may be counted important even though
the decision, as it turns out, is the most unfavorable one imaginable and one’s
efforts have not proved influential.
Michelman, supra, at 127-28.
88
See Kennedy, supra note 86, at 287 (noting that hearing rights “are
significant . . . because they fulfill dignitary values”); Mashaw, supra note 87, at 886-98
(discussing analyses of due process that focus on “the degree to which decisional
processes preserve and enhance human dignity and self-respect”); Perales, supra note
68, at 892 (stating that the “Goldberg promise” is to “afford[] the dignity of being
listened to, of being taken seriously”). See generally Diller, supra note 61, at 1203 n.418
(summarizing the “extensive literature arguing that fair process is a fundamental form
of respect for humanity”).
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The Court’s fair hearing requirement was also lauded for its
potential to promote government accountability. Following Goldberg,
welfare caseworkers knew that their decisions were no longer without
oversight. Recipients could challenge the decisions and compel the
agency to identify and turn over the evidence supporting its determinations. In this sense, the right to a fair hearing was seen as creating
89
In the
incentives to improve accuracy in agency decisionmaking.
words of Robert Rabin, Goldberg served as “a strong declaration that a
search for the Right Answer was paramount, and that agencies would
be required, whatever the literal terms of their statutory mandates,
to establish processes reducing the risk of error to an absolute
90
minimum.”
Yet despite the short-term victory and long-term promise represented by Goldberg, the right to a fair hearing was subject to considera91
ble criticism. Some scholars believed the Court’s view of procedural
due process was unduly narrow. For example, Judge Henry Friendly
assailed the hearing requirement for imposing inflexible standards on
welfare administrators and foreclosing experimentation with other
92
forms of procedural safeguards. For public benefits such as welfare,
Judge Friendly argued that the Court too quickly adopted an adversarial hearing model rather than allowing welfare administrators to
experiment with more investigative or inquisitorial approaches to
93
adjudication.
Other scholars exposed the limits of the fair hearing right. Arguing that merely making fair hearings available does not guarantee that
erroneous deprivations of property rights will be overturned, Joel
Handler identified the many conditions that must be satisfied before a
welfare recipient can successfully challenge an erroneous decision at a
89

See Kennedy, supra note 86, at 287 (arguing that fair hearing rights are significant
because, inter alia, they “improve the accuracy of agency determinations”); David A.
Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1065 (2005) (“[O]ne advantage of the adversarial system may be
its accuracy . . . .”).
90
Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1314 (1986).
91
See generally Forbath, supra note 66, at 1856 (“The right to a hearing has not been
treated kindly by critical legal scholars looking back on Goldberg v. Kelly and the welfare
rights movement.”).
92
See Friendly, supra note 42, at 1269 (criticizing “the tendency to judicialize
administrative procedures”).
93
See id. at 1316 (“There is need for experimentation, particularly for the use of the
investigative model, for empirical studies, and for avoiding absolutes.”).
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fair hearing. According to Handler, the recipient must know that a
wrong has been committed, know that there is a remedy, have the resources to pursue the remedy, and calculate that the benefits of victory
94
will outweigh the costs of trying. If any one of these conditions is not
met, the right to a fair hearing is useless and the erroneous depriva95
tion will stand.
Scholars also criticized the Court’s reliance on fair hearings as the
exclusive means for welfare recipients to exercise their due process
rights. As Lucie White explained, even when recipients request a fair
hearing, feelings of intimidation and fear of retaliation can prevent
recipients from speaking freely and participating fully in the hearing
process—especially when they lack economic security and independ96
ence. Relatedly, White questioned whether the right to a fair hearing actually compelled the government to treat welfare recipients
97
with dignity or addressed recipients’ feelings of subordination or
98
oppression.
94

HANDLER, supra note 70, at 22; see also id. at 22-34 (noting internal and
external barriers that may prevent an average person from successfully asserting a
due process claim).
95
See id. at 22. According to Handler, “It seems self-evident that the poor,
minorities, the poorly educated, the newcomer, the frightened, the mentally ill, the
sick, and other disadvantaged are not only more likely to suffer distress and injustice
than those better off, but are also less likely to negotiate the antecedents of disputes.”
Id. at 24 (internal citation omitted).
96
See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 54 (1990). As White notes:
In order to feel safe to speak out at a hearing, . . . [the recipient] needs
more than post hoc remedies against overt acts of retaliation. She also needs to
feel economically secure, economically independent. . . . The social policies
that might create such conditions are vigorously contested, and the political
will that might enact them is not apparent. Without such economic security,
however, post hoc measures to deter retaliation will never fully dismantle the
barrier that intimidation imposes to her speech.
Id.; see also id. at 52 (“[R]emoving formal barriers to participation is not enough in our
stratified society to achieve procedural justice, even in the modest sense of enabling all
persons to participate in the rituals of their self-government on an equal basis.”).
97
See Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 887 (1990) (“Constitutionalizing welfare procedures has not done
very much to imbue the welfare system with the norms of human dignity that the Kelly
decision rhetorically endorsed.”).
98
See id. at 872 (arguing that lawyer-engineered remedies like Goldberg “still do not
challenge the lived experience of subordination—the experience, that is, of other
people controlling the terms of one’s life”); see also William H. Simon, The Rule of Law
and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 787 (1990)
(claiming that, with respect to the dignity of welfare beneficiaries, the Goldberg
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Looking beyond the hearing room, scholars disputed the extent to
which the right to a fair hearing could prevent erroneous deprivations
of benefits from happening in the first place. Fair hearings do not
address barriers that prevent eligible individuals from applying for wel99
fare in the first instance. But scholars also contended that even after
an individual submits an application, fair hearings provide “a very un100
systematic check on the quality of initial adjudications of claims,”
101
and do not sufficiently deter improper or illegal welfare policies.
And, of course, “fair hearings are virtually useless where a claimant was
102
denied in technical compliance with the agency’s own rules.”
Somewhat counterintuitively, the fair hearing right was also attacked for harming welfare recipients. After Goldberg, some welfare
administrators attempted to streamline fair hearing procedures in ways
103
that resulted in less, not more, procedural protection for recipients.

approach “is unresponsive to the sense of oppression and degradation that the
bureaucratized system engenders, as well as to the often gratuitous practical burdens of
bureaucratic paper pushing and hoop jumping that the system imposes”).
99
See Simon, supra note 98, at 786 (“[S]ome eligible beneficiaries do not even
make it into the administrative sphere because they lack the information or resources
needed to file an application.”); White, supra note 97, at 868-69 (“[T]he [Goldberg v.]
Kelly remedy does not even reach the front end of the [welfare application] process,
where a variety of tactics are used to screen out income-eligible applicants on
procedural grounds, and to discourage others from seeking welfare at all.” (footnotes
omitted)).
100
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 787 (1974).
101
See id. at 776-91 (arguing that fair hearings are unable to ensure accurate, fair,
and timely adjudications of welfare benefit claims); Super, supra note 89, at 1086
(“Over time, the fair-hearing system has shown significant limitations in policing
eligibility workers’ behavior.”); White, supra note 97, at 868 (arguing that fair hearings
are a “weak deterrent against illegal welfare policies” and that “[a] trickle of fair
hearings will not deter a welfare agency from systematically misreading the law,
particularly when the error will reduce welfare costs”). According to William Simon, in
places with high appeal rates like New York City, the fair hearing system “seems to have
the perverse effect of reducing pressure for general administrative reform . . . . Rather
than correcting errors or trying to get their superiors to do so, the workers tell the
beneficiaries to take their claims to hearing.” Simon, supra note 98, at 787.
102
David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for
Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 835 n.57 (2004). For example, fair hearings
are of little value to a recipient “if a broken-down city bus prevents [her] from arriving at
an interview and the program’s rules make no provision for rescheduling” or “[i]f [she]
misunderstood the eligibility worker or an agency form and missed a deadline.” Id.
103
See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 176 (observing that post-Goldberg “[f]air
hearings were routinized and sped up, making it more difficult for recipients to
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William Simon and Jerry Mashaw argued that the Supreme Court’s
focus on fair hearings prompted systemic changes in welfare admin104
istration that ultimately threatened the interests of recipients, while
others claimed that Goldberg’s right to a fair hearing has masked injus105
tices that plague the administration of welfare benefits.
Lastly, the welfare recipients’ victory in Goldberg did not have the effect sought by members of the welfare rights movement. In one sense,
the right to a fair hearing came too late—by the early 1970s, the fair
hearing campaigns of the 1960s had mostly run their course and the
106
welfare rights movement was in retreat.
Indeed, Goldberg was soon
challenge the bureaucracy by asserting their rights to appeal” (citing BAUM, supra note
68, at 39-40)).
104
Mashaw described the post-Goldberg situation—in particular, the collision of
rapidly increasing welfare rolls and states’ unwillingness to provide more funding for
hearings or benefits—as follows:
A strategy was needed that would preserve fiscal integrity and produce defensible decisions.
A number of tactical moves ultimately comprised the grand design. One
was to tighten up and slow down the initial eligibility determination process.
Another was to generalize and objectify the substantive eligibility criteria so
that messy subjective judgments about individual cases would not have to be
made and defended. This move led to the realization that professional social
welfare workers were no longer needed. Costs could be reduced further by
lowering the quality of the staff and by depersonalizing staff-claimant encounters. If these reactions were not sufficient to restore fiscal balance, then payment levels could be reduced or allowed to remain stable in the face of rising
prices. . . . Moreover, because hearings presumably protected the claimants’
interests, internal audit procedures were skewed to ignore nonpayment and
underpayment problems and concentrate on preventing over-payments and
payments to ineligibles.
MASHAW, supra note 42, at 34.
According to Simon, the “administrative changes that accompanied the emergence
of the hearing system severely threaten beneficiary interests. At worst, they encourage
denials of benefits to eligible beneficiaries. . . . More generally, the tendency of
administrative change has been to reduce the availability of administrative advice and
assistance to claimants at the same time as to increase claimants’ need for them by
making the process of establishing and maintaining eligibility more complex.” Simon,
supra note 98, at 786; see also William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the
Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-19 (1983) (describing the shift toward a more
formalistic administration of welfare programs).
105
See Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 708-09 (1980) (reviewing
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)) (claiming that
Goldberg deflected advocates “into a fruitless struggle against a bureaucracy that readily
swallowed the Court-prescribed dose of due process without any change in symptoms,
and . . . bolster[ed] the idea that fairness was not far away in the American welfare state”).
106
See KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 176 (“From the perspective of welfare rights
activists, Justice Brennan’s affirmation of the right to a pre-termination fair hearing
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derided for gaining little of substance for welfare recipients and, even
107
worse, diverting energy from the movement.
Turning briefly to Mathews, scholars from across the political spectrum questioned the Court’s adoption of a utilitarian balancing approach to determine how much process is due in a particular situation.
Conservative scholars argued that it was inappropriate for judges to
108
determine what process is due.
Under the positivist view of procedural due process, for example, Judge Easterbrook claimed that the
procedures required by the Due Process Clause must be limited to
109
Simithose procedures specified by existing state and federal laws.
larly, Richard Epstein argued that court-ordered fair hearings and

came too late to do the work that they had planned for it. Although the hearings were
a longstanding demand, [Goldberg] was overwhelmed by defeats that came at virtually
the same moment.”). The welfare rights movement depended on society’s responding
liberally to pressure on welfare agencies. See Richard A. Cloward & Frances Fox Piven,
The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty, NATION, May 2, 1966, at 510, 510
(describing a welfare rights strategy that involved, inter alia, using fair hearings to
overwhelm the welfare system and prompt antipoverty legislation). However realistic
that might have been in the mid- or late-1960s, the election and reelection of President
Nixon showed that such a response was unlikely. Indeed, by the time Nixon’s Family
Assistance Plan was defeated in 1971, it was clear that any changes to the existing
welfare system would be to make welfare less, not more, generous. See generally
KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 148-60 (discussing the Nixon Administration’s shift
toward a more conservative welfare policy).
107
See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 66, at 1856 (arguing that the right to a fair hearing
has become “a quintessential lawyer’s process-based reform, easily routinized within the
welfare bureaucracy, its pursuit sapping movement energy and gaining nothing of
substance”).
108
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85,
109-19 (discussing different approaches to determining what process is due).
109
See id. at 125 (“Giving judges this power of revision may be wise or not. The
Court may design its procedures well or poorly. But there is no sound argument that
this is a legitimate power or function of the Court.”). This argument has been referred
to as the “bitter with the sweet” approach to procedural due process. Id. at 86. It first
arose in the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy. See 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974)
(“[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the
limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a
litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.”). However, this
approach was specifically rejected by six Justices. See id. at 166-67 (Powell, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 177-78, 185 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting). The Court ultimately rejected the approach in Cleveland Board of Education
v. Loudermill. 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C.
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J.
455, 457-68 (1986) (challenging the positivist view of procedural due process).
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other such procedures resulted from a misguided effort to micro110
manage administrative agencies.
At the same time, more liberal scholars assailed the instrumentalist
tendencies of the Mathews cost-benefit approach to procedural due
process. They argued that Mathews placed too much emphasis on effi111
112
ciency, disregarding “process values,” and focusing on “subsidiary
113
They
issues rather than the essence of the due process guarantee.”
114
also charged the Mathews approach with being impractical and easy
115
to manipulate.
D. Doctrinal Stability, Procedural Ossification, and Critical Silence
The flurry of activity following Goldberg and Mathews did not last for
long. Once local, state, and federal agencies brought their administrative procedures in line with the Court’s new interpretation of procedural due process, there was little more to be done. Aside from minor
alterations in response to lawsuits targeting procedural flaws in partic-

110

See Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 770-75 (1990)
(“Surely it is not possible to say here that the political process has failed utterly, even
from Justice Brennan’s perspective, given the level of procedural protection that it did
generate. Why then ask the courts to micromanage the difference?”).
111
See, e.g., Redish & Marshall, supra note 109, at 473 (“An efficiency-oriented
balancing test, therefore, weighs an inevitable and immediately recognizable
administrative cost against a largely prophylactic interest in the use of specific
procedural protections.”).
112
E.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976) (“The Eldridge Court conceives of the values of procedure
too narrowly: it views the sole purpose of procedural protections as ensuring
accuracy, and thus limits its calculus to the benefits or costs that flow from incorrect
decisions. No attention is paid to ‘process values’ . . . .”); see also supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
113
Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044,
1138 (1984).
114
See id. at 1136-44; see also id. at 1138 (“This reliance upon ‘weight,’ which is a
useful approach for dealing with bananas, leaves something to be desired where factors
such as those in Mathews are concerned.”); Mashaw, supra note 112, at 48 (criticizing
the Mathews approach for “ask[ing] unanswerable questions”).
115
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674 (2d ed. 1988)
(arguing that the Mathews balancing approach to procedural due process “not only
overlooks the unquantifiable human interest in receiving decent treatment, but also
provides the Court a facile means to justify the most cursory procedures by altering the
relative weights to be accorded each of the three factors” (footnotes omitted)).
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116

ular situations and some experimentation with additional procedural
117
safeguards, the fair hearing procedures available today look virtually
118
identical to those established in the wake of Goldberg and Mathews.
The attention paid by scholars to procedural due process followed
a similar arc. After a rich debate over the Supreme Court’s approach
to procedural due process in Goldberg and Mathews during the 1970s and
1980s, most scholars shifted their focus to other areas of law. Although
the 1996 federal welfare law caused a spike in scholarly attention to
119
procedural due process, that interest quickly subsided. By 1998,
116

Challenges to welfare fair hearing procedures began immediately following
Goldberg. See, e.g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1078 (2d Cir. 1971)
(challenging fair hearing procedures adopted by New York City after Goldberg and
stating that “this case begins where Goldberg v. Kelly ends” (citations omitted)). Some
post-Goldberg lawsuits involved due process challenges to rules granting eligibility
workers virtually unlimited and unreviewable discretion. See, e.g., Carey v. Quern, 588
F.2d 230, 231 (7th Cir. 1978) (challenging rule concerning recipients’ entitlement to a
clothing allowance); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 751 (7th Cir. 1976) (challenging
termination of general assistance grants based on administrator’s own unwritten
personal standards). Others challenged the adequacy of notices used to reduce or
discontinue various types of public benefits. See, e.g., Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967, 969
(7th Cir. 1988) (unemployment insurance); Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889, 890 (3d Cir.
1986) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)); Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d
250, 252 (3d Cir. 1984) (WIC); Dilda v. Quern, 612 F.2d 1055, 1055 (7th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam) (AFDC); Eder v. Beal, 609 F.2d 695, 696 (3d Cir. 1979) (Medicaid); Banks
v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 838 (7th Cir. 1975) (food stamps); Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d
485, 486 (7th Cir. 1974) (Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled).
117
See infra Section III.B.
118
See Telephone Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, Dir. of Litig., N.Y. Legal
Assistance Grp. (Mar. 26, 2012) (discussing her experiences representing individuals at
fair hearings held during the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s).
119
Scholars offered some initial thoughts on the status of welfare recipients’ due
process rights after the enactment of the 1996 federal welfare law. See, e.g., Christine N.
Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89,
125-32 (2002) (discussing the status of welfare recipients’ procedural due process rights
after 1996); Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing “Revolution” and “Reform”: Procedural Due
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 618-23 (1998) (arguing that the
1996 law’s anti-entitlement provision, 42 U.S.C. § 401 (2006), is directed at recipients’
ability, accepted by the Supreme Court in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), to enforce
statutory terms and conditions against state programs, rather than individual
recipients’ due process rights); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process:
Countering the Due Process Counterrevoution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 36 (1997) (suggesting
that, after 1996, “welfare beneficiaries may no longer be constitutionally entitled to pretermination hearings, or to any other due process protections”); see also infra notes 12931 and accompanying text.
Later, scholars examined the effect of welfare privatization on recipients’ due
process rights. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization,
116 HARV. L. R EV. 1285, 1307-10 (2003) (discussing impact of welfare privatization on
due process rights); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized
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Cynthia Farina accurately referred to this silence as “a long dry spell”
120
in the debate over procedural due process.
In the meantime, Goldberg’s right to a fair hearing remains good law
and welfare agencies continue to act accordingly. Indeed, despite the
radical changes wrought by the 1996 federal welfare law, as well as new
facts and circumstances that have come with the passage of time, welfare recipients’ procedural due process rights are the same today as
they were over forty years ago.
II. POST-GOLDBERG CHANGES TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF WELFARE PROGRAMS AND WELFARE RECIPIENTS
When the Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly that welfare recipients have a due process right to a fair hearing before their benefits
are terminated, the Court chose the required procedural safeguards
based on its careful consideration of the facts and circumstances as
121
they existed in 1970.
The Court reaffirmed this fact-intensive approach to procedural due process six years later in Mathews v. Eldridge,
when it adopted the three-factor balancing framework for evaluating
122
During the decades
due process claims that remains in use today.
since Goldberg and Mathews, welfare programs have changed in a variety
of ways that affect the facts as the Goldberg Court understood them and
that bear upon one or more of the Mathews factors.
The most obvious and consequential change to welfare since Goldberg occurred when President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
123
(PRWORA). PRWORA abolished the open-ended, federal matching
funding structure of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children

Welfare, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 603-23 (2001) (discussing the enforcement of due
process rights in a privatized welfare system); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1383-88 (2003) (describing the expansion of
welfare privatization and how such systems may undermine constitutional
accountability). See generally Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting
for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1259 (2003) (describing privitization’s
struggle with maintaining accountability).
120
Farina, supra note 119, at 591.
121
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1970).
122
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-49 (1976).
123
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended primarily in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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124

(AFDC) program and replaced it with the Temporary Assistance for
125
Among its
Needy Families (TANF) program’s fixed block grants.
most consequential programmatic changes, PRWORA shifted significant policymaking authority from the federal government to the
126
states, instituted a five-year limit on an individual’s receipt of federal
127
cash benefits, and imposed work requirements on recipients of wel128
fare benefits.
PRWORA’s enactment cast doubt on the procedural due process
rights that had been afforded to welfare recipients since Goldberg. The
statute declared an end to any statutory entitlement to federal assis129
tance, sparking debate over whether welfare benefits still qualified as
property interests subject to due process protection. Numerous scholars made the case for why recipients retained the right to a fair hear130
ing established by Goldberg, while others sought to expose the
131
harmful consequences of weakened due process protections.
124

The first incarnation of AFDC, Aid to Dependent Children, was created by the
Social Security Act of 1935. Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 401–406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-629
(repealed 1996). The law was amended and renamed Aid to Families with Dependent
Children in 1962. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(1)–
(5), 76 Stat. 172, 185 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
125
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2006).
126
See id. § 604(a)(1) (providing that states can use the TANF block grant “in any
manner that is reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose of this part”); see also
Diller, supra note 61, at 1147 (“PRWORA largely permits states to design their own
programs . . . .”); Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of
Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. R EV. 573,
593 (2004) (stating that in passing PRWORA, Congress “relinquished unprecedented
programmatic responsibility over welfare to the states”).
127
See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (“A State . . . shall not use any part of the grant to
provide assistance . . . for 60 months (whether or not consecutive) after the date the
State program funded under this part commences . . . .”).
128
See id. § 607(a)(1) (establishing minimum work participation rates).
129
See id. § 601(b) (“This part [§§ 601–619] shall not be interpreted to entitle any
individual or family to assistance under any State program funded under this part.”).
Despite this anti-entitlement language, the statute also included a vague requirement
that states provide a process that sounds like a fair hearing. See id. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iii)
(requiring states to “provide opportunities for recipients who have been adversely affected
to be heard in a State administrative or appeal process”).
130
See, e.g., Cimini, supra note 119, at 125-32; Farina, supra note 119, at 618-23;
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don’t Add Up To Rights: The Importance of Preserving Due
Process In Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111, 1139-49 (1996)
(identifying approaches to preserving due process rights after welfare reform).
131
See, e.g., Randal S. Jeffrey, The Importance of Due Process Protections After Welfare
Reform: Client Stories from New York City, 66 ALB. L. REV. 123, 125-27 (2002)
(documenting the impact of weakened due process protections on welfare recipients in
New York City); cf. Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal: Differences in Caseworker
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More than fifteen years after the passage of PRWORA, however, fears
about the demise of the fair hearing right appear to have been overstated. Very few welfare agencies have disputed recipients’ right to a fair
hearing, and the only state court to consider whether such a right
remains after PRWORA held that, under the laws of that state, recipients
132
are still entitled to the due process protections mandated by Goldberg.
Although welfare recipients’ right to a fair hearing has survived the
133
major changes to welfare in the mid-1990s, whether fair hearings
provide recipients with meaningful procedural safeguards against erroneous deprivations is far from clear. Many aspects of welfare and
the circumstances of welfare recipients have changed since the Court
decided Goldberg in 1970, and some of these changes bear upon one or
more of the Mathews factors.
As this Part will show, these changes can be organized into three
categories. First, welfare administrators now contend with new and
powerful incentives to shrink the welfare rolls. Second, the circumstances in which welfare recipients find themselves have changed in
ways that undermine recipients’ ability to exercise their right to a fair
hearing in a meaningful way. For example, recipients who are able to
hold jobs often must choose between exercising their right to a fair
hearing and keeping their job, and all recipients are much less likely
to secure free legal representation at fair hearings. Third, technological advancements have streamlined aspects of welfare administration
and created opportunities for additional procedural safeguards at little
extra cost. At the same time, welfare administrators’ increased reliance on automation has exposed recipients to new risks of erroneous
deprivations. Finally, this Part distills the new procedural needs welfare recipients face in light of some or all of these changes.
A. New Incentives to Terminate Welfare Benefits
Welfare administrators today are subject to powerful incentives—
incentives that that did not exist in the 1970s—to reduce the welfare
Support Towards Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 HARV. J. AFR. A M. PUB. POL’Y 23, 27-31
(1997) (describing differences in discretionary treatment of white and black welfare
recipients in Virginia).
132
See Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469, 477 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[W]e conclude that
because plaintiffs had a property right . . . in continued receipt of welfare benefits,
plaintiffs were constitutionally entitled to procedural due process.”).
133
See Lens, supra note 66, at 30 (stating that, even after the 1996 law “[a]ll
states . . . provide some form of administrative hearings”).
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rolls. The primary source for these new incentives is the 1996 federal
welfare law, which restructured the welfare system in ways that rewarded
states for reducing the number of individuals receiving welfare bene134
At the same time, the legislation’s rollback of federal statutory
fits.
and regulatory rules granted states more welfare policymaking author135
ity than they had enjoyed since the early 1960s, while undercutting
preexisting means of holding administrators and caseworkers account136
137
able for their decisions. This new discretionary regime has created
opportunities for the caseload-cutting incentives to affect the routine
138
handling of welfare cases, placing more pressure on the fair hearing
139
system to weed out erroneous terminations.
Incentives to cut people off welfare are not new. Five years before
the Supreme Court decided Goldberg, Edward Sparer argued that welfare administrators are subject to strong incentives to reduce costs, and
that those incentives are rarely balanced by pressure to achieve the
140
substantive purposes of welfare programs.
The federal government

134

See infra subsection II.A.1.
See Diller, supra note 61, at 1134-40, 1145-48 (identifying different paradigms of
welfare administration).
136
See id. at 1186-212 (arguing that the current welfare regime “has the potential to
render existing mechanisms for establishing public accountability largely ineffective or
irrelevant”); see also Super, supra note 102, at 869-80 (noting the challenges facing
advocates trying to promote accountability).
137
See Diller, supra note 61, at 1145-63 (describing the return to discretion
following passage of the 1996 federal welfare law).
138
See Michaels, supra note 126, at 598 (noting that states “may exploit their
discretionary authority and under-provide services in ways that leave hundreds of
thousands of individuals materially far worse off than even a fiscally conservative
Congress might have intended”); cf. REBECCA GORDON, APPLIED RESEARCH CTR.,
CRUEL AND USUAL: HOW WELFARE “REFORM” PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 18 (2001)
(finding that the post-1996 welfare system was “overwhelmingly arbitrary” in
determining eligibility for benefits); Gooden, supra note 131, at 23 (describing
differences in the discretionary treatment of white and black welfare recipients).
139
These new incentives have also greatly increased the risk that welfare agencies
will turn away eligible applicants in order to limit their welfare caseloads. See Diller,
supra note 61, at 1152 (discussing states’ adoption of “‘diversion’ policies—that seek to
dissuade potentially eligible individuals from applying for benefits.”). These types of
front-end decisions are very difficult to challenge at a fair hearing. Id. at 1201 (“Diversion activities are generally beyond the reach of the hearing process as individuals who
are diverted are not formally denied benefits and thus have no determinations from
which to appeal.”); see also supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
140
See Edward V. Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client’s Lawyer, 12 UCLA L. REV. 361,
375 (1965) (explaining that “[v]irtually no pressure . . . is ordinarily exerted on behalf
of the welfare client,” while welfare administrators must contend with “many inhibiting
factors”).
135
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contributed to this imbalance in the 1970s when it adopted a “quality
141
control” regime for AFDC that punished states for overpayments and
payments to ineligible recipients, but not for underpayments or exclu142
sions of eligible beneficiaries. Despite the existence of the fair hear143
ing right, fair hearings did not exert a “counterbalancing influence.”
Thus, even before 1996, welfare administrators and caseworkers were
pressured to deny, reduce, or terminate benefits with little fear of repercussion.
Yet the incentives at work prior to 1996 pale in comparison to those
created by PRWORA. Since its passage, welfare administrators have
faced new and powerful financial incentives to reduce the number of
individuals receiving welfare benefits. At the same time, states and
localities have been given the freedom to contract out the administration of welfare programs, which has introduced additional incentives
to reduce welfare caseloads. These new incentives, together with increased ground-level discretion and a political atmosphere that is
144
deeply hostile to welfare programs, have revolutionized the administration of welfare benefits in ways that have greatly increased the risk
of erroneous deprivations.

141

In the context of public benefit programs, quality control or quality assurance
systems “typically take the form of specialized audits in which an independent unit
examines a subset of cases in which benefits were granted to check for errors.” Super,
supra note 89, at 1098-99.
142
See EVELYN Z. BRODKIN, THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:
IMPLEMENTING QUALITY CONTROL IN WELFARE 9-11, 94-100 (1986) (discussing
incentives created by AFDC’s quality control mechanisms); Timothy J. Casey & Mary R.
Mannix, Quality Control in Public Assistance: Victimizing the Poor Through One-Sided
Accountability, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1381, 1385 (1989) (explaining that the welfare
quality control system caused denials of eligible families to skyrocket); Anna Lou
Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The Maladministration of New York City’s
Public Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 231, 245-47 (1990)
(linking quality control systems with the phenomenon of overdenial of benefits); cf.
Super, supra note 89, at 1109-10 (detailing the perverse incentives created by the food
stamp program’s quality control system). These types of quality control mechanisms
have been called “counter-entitlements.” See id. at 1073 (“Even before PRWORA, the
counter-entitlement balancing the entitlement to [AFDC] was far stronger than the
entitlement, influencing agencies’ behavior far more powerfully.”).
143
Diller, supra note 61, at 1142. Indeed, even when eligibility workers’ decisions to
deny, reduce, or terminate benefits were overturned at a fair hearing, the “workers
were not held accountable.” Id.
144
See id. at 1183 (“Political leaders now compete for the largest declines in welfare
enrollment. Where enrollment has not plummeted as quickly as elsewhere, welfare
reform is deemed a failure. In fact, TANF caseload reduction is the most common
performance measure used by local agencies.”(footnote omitted)).
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1. Changes in Welfare Funding Create New Incentives
to Terminate Welfare Benefits
PRWORA redesigned the way the federal government funds the
provision of welfare benefits. Prior to 1996, the AFDC program required the federal government to provide matching funds equal to a
145
portion of a state’s expenditures on welfare.
Since then, however,
the federal government has provided annual block grants in a fixed
146
Under this system, states receive the same amount of fedamount.
eral funding whether their welfare caseloads increase, decrease, or stay
the same. And if a state does not exhaust its block grant funds in a
particular year, it is not required to return all of the unspent money to
147
the federal government.
The post-1996 block-grant–funding mechanism creates powerful
new financial incentives for the states. By reducing the number of individuals receiving welfare benefits, states can reallocate federal welfare funds to support more popular programs, even programs
148
unrelated to the provision of social welfare services. In other words,
paying welfare benefits to the poor now competes with the rest of a
149
For example, in 1998, Wisconsin spent
state’s budgetary priorities.
$98 million less on welfare than it received in its block grant for that
150
Rather than returning the money to the federal government,
year.
145

See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (Supp. II 1996) (establishing the method of computing
federal payments to states).
146
A state’s block grant amount is based on the amount it received from the AFDC
program in the mid-1990s, with states exercising some choice over three alternative base
periods. See id. § 603(a)(1) (2006) (describing how a state’s block grant is calculated).
147
Id. § 604(d)–(e).
148
See Super, supra note 89, at 1131 (“[The] simultaneous conversion of states’
former AFDC funding into a fixed block grant gave states a further fiscal incentive to
reduce participation since they could use any resulting savings in other programs.”); see
also Michaels, supra note 126, at 613 (“[States] may use their legally granted discretion
to free up federal dollars ostensibly earmarked for welfare provisions to support more
popular projects.”). This process has been referred to as “supplantation” and has been
subject to criticism by Congress. See Letter from Rep. Nancy L. Johnson, Chairman,
U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Ways & Means, to U.S. Governors (Mar. 15,
2000), available at http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/johnson00.htm (urging states to stop
supplantation and warning that “if the savings from supplanted federal funds are used
for purposes other than those specified in the TANF legislation, Congress will react by
assuming that we have provided states with too much money”).
149
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-828, WELFARE REFORM:
CHALLENGES IN MAINTAINING A FEDERAL-STATE FISCAL PARTNERSHIP 6 (2001)
(finding that states have “replaced, rather than supplemented, their own spending with
federal TANF dollars thereby freeing up state funds for other budget priorities”).
150
Michaels, supra note 126, at 617.
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spending the savings on welfare programs, or strengthening the social
safety net in some other way, it used the unspent TANF money to fund
151
Other states have saved
education, tax relief, and other programs.
152
their unspent federal block grant funds for a “rainy day.” Thus, the
more states can shrink their welfare caseloads, the more TANF block
grant money they can use for other spending priorities.
This type of incentive has worked its way down to the county level.
In Ohio, where each county negotiates its own plan for welfare administration with the state, the state offers financial rewards to counties
that reduce the number of people receiving welfare benefits: counties
that reduce their caseloads receive financial bonuses, and counties
“that spend less than their allocated amounts can retain fifty percent
153
of the difference.” Similarly, in California, the state passes along its
TANF funding in the form of block grants to the counties, and counties are permitted to retain one-hundred percent of any savings that
154
Thus, for cashoccurs when recipients leave the welfare rolls.
strapped counties in these states, welfare programs have become a
tempting source of additional funds.
2. Federal Work Requirements Create New Incentives to
Terminate Welfare Benefits
PRWORA’s requirement that welfare recipients work in exchange
for their benefits creates powerful incentives for states and localities
administering welfare programs—but perhaps not the incentives one
155
might expect. By establishing financial penalties for states that do

151

Id. at 617. Other states have also used unspent TANF block grant funds to
support programs unrelated to the social safety net. See, e.g., Joshua Green, The Welfare
Shell Game (describing Texas’s intent to substitute federal funds for state funds and thus
“launder[] federal welfare dollars to finance more politically popular programs”), in
MAKING WORK PAY: AMERICA AFTER WELFARE 46, 46 (Robert Kuttner ed., 2002);
Sewell Chan, D.C. Welfare Funds to Go to Children; Critics Say $12 Million Shift Irresponsible,
WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2000, at B1 (describing reallocation of TANF funds away from
helping “move welfare recipients into the workforce” and toward youth initiatives); Jim
McLean & Chris Grenz, Use of Welfare Grant Debated, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J., Aug. 30, 2000,
at 7, available at 2000 WLNR 4302386 (describing Kansas’s redirection of nearly half its
TANF money to foster care programs).
152
Michaels, supra note 126, at 617.
153
Diller, supra note 61, at 1179-80.
154
Id. at 1180.
155
See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(3) (2006) (establishing penalties of up to twenty-one
percent of a state’s TANF grant for states that fail to comply with the work
participation rate).
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156

not meet statewide work participation rates, the law obviously incentivizes states to demand that welfare recipients engage in some form of
work. However, there is an even stronger set of incentives built into
PRWORA’s structure. A state can avoid being penalized for failing to
satisfy its work participation requirement by reducing the size of its
welfare caseload. For each percentage point that a state’s average
monthly caseload declines in comparison to a benchmark level set by
statute, the state is granted a “caseload reduction credit” that reduces
157
the state’s work participation requirement by one percentage point.
Under this system, states that have aggressively cut their welfare caseloads since 1996 are rewarded with relaxed work participation
requirements.
The availability of caseload reduction credits has created a strong
158
incentive for states to push recipients off the welfare rolls. Establishing workfare programs and helping recipients transition from welfare
159
to work can be expensive, while finding ways to close cases and reap
caseload reduction credits is cheap and reduces costs in the long run.
It is therefore not surprising that states have used caseload reduction
credits to shield themselves from the full impact of PRWORA’s work
participation requirements. Indeed, from 2000 to 2005, caseload reduction credits rendered the federal statewide work requirements almost meaningless: despite a statutory minimum work participation rate
of fifty percent, caseload reduction credits resulted in an adjusted rate

156

Mandatory statewide work participation rates started at twenty-five percent of
welfare recipients in 1997 and peaked at fifty percent in 2002, where the rate remains
today. Id. § 607(a)(1).
157
See id. § 607(b)(3)(A)(ii) (setting the benchmark at the state’s 2005 caseload).
The caseload reduction credit benchmark was initially set at a state’s 1995 welfare
caseload. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 2005). But the Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005 changed the benchmark to a state’s 2005 caseload. Pub. L. No. 109-171,
§ 7102(a)(1)(B), 120 Stat. 4, 136 (2006).
158
See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. R EV. 552, 617-18 (1999)
(“[T]he structure of the Act creates a strong incentive for state political actors to focus
exclusively on achieving caseload reductions, regardless of the means or consequences,
or to approach welfare reform merely as a means for achieving fiscal savings.”); Diller,
supra note 61, at 1179 (explaining that PRWORA’s creation of caseload reduction
credits “places a premium on achieving caseload reduction through means that make it
more difficult for ‘eligible’ individuals to obtain benefits initially and to maintain
eligibility once on the rolls”); cf. Super, supra note 102, at 848 (“[T]he TANF statute
gives a strong preference to caseload reductions through informal means.”).
159
See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 84, 117 (1995).
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of zero percent for thirty-one states, with the remaining nineteen states
160
facing requirements between one percent and twenty-eight percent.
3. Opportunities for Privatization Create New Incentives
to Terminate Welfare Benefits
The 1996 welfare law introduced an additional set of incentives to
terminate benefits when it removed statutory limitations on the ability
of states and localities to privatize the administration of welfare pro161
grams. For the first time, private corporations were permitted to take
over all aspects of welfare administration, including individual eligibility
162
determinations. The private entities that have since won contracts to
administer welfare programs have brought new norms and motivations,
163
resulting in additional pressure to reduce the welfare rolls.
The contracting out of welfare services to for-profit entities is a relatively recent phenomenon. It began with contracts to run work programs, which became more commonplace after the Family Support
164
Act of 1988 expanded federal work requirements.
Private entities
were also enlisted to handle functions such as information manage165
Prior to 1996, however, federal law
ment and data processing.
160

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE , GAO-02-770, WELFARE REFORM: WITH TANF
FLEXIBILITY, STATES VARY IN HOW THEY IMPLEMENT WORK REQUIREMENTS AND TIME
LIMITS 11-12 tbl.2 (2002). The work participation requirements returned to prominence
in 2006, after the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 set a new benchmark for caseload
reduction credits. See supra note 157. But states were later effectively excused from
penalties for failing to satisfy the requirements by language contained in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 2101(b), 123 Stat. 115,
448-69 (2009) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. III 2009)).
161
In this context, the terms “privatize” and “privatization” refer to contracting out
the administration of all or part of TANF programs to private contractors that are
typically reimbursed and evaluated pursuant to performance measures that emphasize
outcomes. See Diller, supra note 61, at 1181-82.
162
See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1) (2006) (permitting states to “administer and provide
services under the [TANF program] through contracts with charitable, religious, or
private organizations” and to provide TANF beneficiaries with “certificates, vouchers,
or other forms of disbursement which are redeemable with such organizations”).
163
See Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power: Reconfiguring
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 279 (2009) (“In
the welfare-to-work area, privatization has been a major tool in a very effective
campaign to significantly reduce the welfare rolls.”).
164
Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 2343, 2357 (requiring “all recipients of
aid to families with dependent children . . . with respect to whom the State guarantees
child care . . . to participate in the [job opportunities and basic skills training]
program”).
165
Michaels, supra note 126, at 624-25.
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expressly prohibited states from privatizing eligibility determinations
166
Thus, corporations did not decide whether
and case management.
to grant or deny welfare benefits or the amount of benefits that should
be issued. In other words, government workers, not employees of private
companies, were the only ones with authority to determine whether to
deprive an individual of his or her constitutionally protected property
interest.
PRWORA repealed AFDC’s constraints on privatization, replacing
them with TANF’s broad grant of permission to states and localities to
167
contract out some or all of their welfare programs. Thus, since 1996,
private corporations have been permitted to make eligibility determi168
nations that result in the deprivation of welfare recipients’ benefits.
This change in the law created an opportunity for both for-profit and
not-for-profit corporations to win contracts to administer entire wel169
fare programs.
The privatization of welfare services has increased dramatically
170
since the 1990s. Many states eagerly turned over much of their newly
171
gained authority to private corporations, while the contracting opportunities created by the 1996 welfare law attracted for-profit corpora172
Within five years of
tions looking for new sources of revenue.
PRWORA’s passage, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia had
contracted with private entities to provide at least some welfare ser166

Id. at 625-26.
See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A); see also Bach, supra note 163, at 279 (“Today, the
full range of services, from eligibility determinations to welfare-to-work services, are
being conducted not directly by government entities but by private, often large, forprofit corporate entities.”).
168
See Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished
Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1559, 1566 (2001) (“The Act now authorizes states to employ private entities to conduct
intake and make eligibility determinations—traditional gate-keeping functions . . . most
often identified with the legal [Goldberg] protections developed under AFDC.”
(footnotes omitted)). However, “[a]s a practical matter, [PRWORA’s] allowance of the
contracting out of eligibility determinations was limited, to a certain extent, by the
federal government’s refusal to allow the contracting out of eligibility determinations
for food stamps and Medicaid.” Bach, supra note 163, at 279 n.10.
169
See Michaels, supra note 126, at 624 (observing that lifting the limits on
privatization gave for-profit corporations “unparalleled and previously uncontemplated
opportunities” to participate in the provision of welfare benefits).
170
See Bach, supra note 163, at 278; see also Kennedy, supra note 86, at 256 (“All over
the country, state governments are turning to private corporations to run their welfare
systems.”).
171
Kennedy, supra note 86, at 232.
172
Bach, supra note 163, at 279-80.
167
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173

vices. Of the $1.5 billion paid by states to private entities to operate
TANF and TANF-related programs in 2001, for-profit entities collected
174
approximately thirteen percent.
The rise of privatization has introduced new incentives to terminate benefits and reduce welfare caseloads. As a general matter, forprofit private contractors are not merely motivated by profit; they have
a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to maximize profits above all
175
other considerations.
In the context of welfare privatization, this
profit motive can affect the way welfare programs are administered,
176
with potentially harmful consequences for welfare recipients.
The incentives at work in welfare privatization are evident in the
terms of payment included in contracts. Many welfare privatization
contracts are “performance-based,” meaning that payment on the contract is conditioned, in whole or in part, on the private company’s sat177
isfaction of some specified outcome or outcomes. Different types of
performance-based contracts create different incentives: contracts
that base payments on the number of individuals served by the vendor
incentivize “churn[ing] or divert[ing]” recipients; contracts that base
payments on flat fees incentivize simply pushing recipients off the
rolls; and contracts that base payments on outcomes, such as the number of recipients placed in a job, incentivize devoting the most resources to those already likely to get jobs while ignoring, underserving, or even closing the cases of individuals facing significant bar178
riers to employment.
173

See U.S. GEN. A CCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-245, WELFARE REFORM: INTERIM
REPORT ON POTENTIAL WAYS TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF STATE AND
LOCAL CONTRACTING 8 (2002).
174
Id. Among the various services provided by contractors to states in 2001, the
most common were “employment and training services, job placement services, and
support services to promote job entry or retention.” Id.
175
See Kennedy, supra note 86, at 302.
176
See id. (arguing that “the private provider will seek to maximize profits even if it
means harming the needy”). The consequences go beyond unjustified terminations of
benefits. See David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
393, 455-56 (2008) (arguing that contracting out the administration of public benefits
programs is “likely to result in some significant policy paralysis”).
177
Diller, supra note 61, at 1181-82.
178
Michaels, supra note 126, at 631; see also Metzger, supra note 119, at 1387-88
(“[U]nder a performance-based system providing financial rewards for the number of
successful job placements, private contractors have a visible incentive to try to serve
only the most employable beneficiaries, or to dissuade hard-to-employ individuals from
continuing in programs by means of onerous participation requirements and
sanctions.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Although contracts for the provision of welfare services can be
structured to incentivize the provision of high-quality services and to
179
protect the rights of welfare recipients, such contracts appear to be
180
the exception and not the rule.
The privatization experience in
Wisconsin is illustrative. There, in its first round of privatization after
the 1996 welfare law, the state made extensive use of private contrac181
tors as part of its welfare-to-work program. By permitting contractors
to keep benefits they withheld from recipients as a result of case sanctions, the contracts created enormous incentives to withhold benefits
182
And even when contracts are strucand services from recipients.
tured to minimize incentives to terminate benefits, the lack of a competitive market for comparable administrative services may reduce
183
contractors’ motivation to comply fully with their contracts.

179

For example, in the wake of welfare reform in Florida, the state established
payment systems that incentivized service provision: contractors were paid twenty
percent of their payment when they placed an individual in a job, and the final ten
percent if the individual kept the job for eight months. Diller, supra note 61, at 1182.
Some scholars have noted that privatization could improve services currently provided
by government agencies. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 119; Metzger, supra note 119;
Minow, supra note 119.
180
See Michaels, supra note 126, at 632 (“[A] shocking number of contracts already
have been subject to abuse of discretion by corporations that have managed to
achieve . . . super-profitable ends—under the noses of government contracting
agents.”); see also id. at 632-33 (discussing problems with welfare contracts in New York,
California, Wisconsin, Connecticut, and Maryland).
181
Karyn Rotker et al., Wisconsin Works—For Private Contractors, That Is, 35
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 530, 533 (2002).
182
Id.; see also SHEENA MCCONNELL ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH,
INC., PRIVATIZATION IN PRACTICE: CASE STUDIES OF CONTRACTING FOR TANF CASE
MANAGEMENT 48 (2003) (observing that Wisconsin’s contracts created the “potential
for serious unintended incentives”). Medicare and Medicaid managed care contracts
have been criticized for creating similar incentives. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 119, at
1383 (acknowledging the “obvious hazards” and “strong financial incentives to deny
coverage for medically needed but expensive treatments” that result from Medicare
contractual provisions that give providers a share of savings from reducing recipients’
cost of care); Jennifer L. Wright, Unconstitutional or Impossible: The Irreconcilable Gap
Between Managed Care and Due Process in Medicaid and Medicare, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 135, 169-70 (2000) (arguing that Medicare and Medicaid managed care
providers have financial incentives to refuse authorization where care exceeds a fixed
rate of compensation per enrollee).
183
See Super, supra note 176, at 418-21 (“[I]f an administrative services vendor is
performing deficiently, the costs and disruption of selecting a new contractor and
having that contractor build up the infrastructure required to operate the program
may leave the state with no other alternative but to stay with its existing contractor.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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To be sure, government bureaucracies also face incentives to re184
Yet the incentives facing private companies
duce welfare caseloads.
are both stronger and more deeply rooted. Jon Michaels has distinguished the two types of incentives this way: “Corporations have a
preexisting fiduciary commitment to shareholders that they are dutybound to prioritize over any commitment to government service. . . . This core institutional characteristic far exceeds any discre185
Thus,
tionary motivation among public bureaucrats to cut costs.”
the pressures on state agencies to reduce their welfare caseloads do
186
not compare to the incentives that influence private corporations.
In addition, to the extent that norms of public service can be said to
characterize the actions of government agencies and their employees,
such norms are absent in the profit-seeking atmosphere of private
187
corporations. Accordingly, without contractual provisions that counteract incentives to cut recipients off the rolls, the post-1996 rise in
privatization increases the risk that welfare benefits are erroneously
terminated.
B. New Circumstances Facing Welfare Recipients
In Goldberg, the Supreme Court emphasized that due process required that the “opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the ca188
Since
pacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”
then, the circumstances facing welfare recipients have changed in
countless ways, some of which bear directly on recipients’ ability to

184

See supra subsections II.A.1-2.
Michaels, supra note 126, at 629 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 628
(explaining that corporations have a “fiduciary duty to promote shareholder wealth,
which goes well beyond a state or city’s incentive to under-provide services”); id. at 629
(“No company can be expected to protect the interests of the needy at the expense of
its bottom line, least of all a publicly traded company with a fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder profits.” (quoting Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run
State Welfare Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at A1)).
186
See Michaels, supra note 126, at 631-32 (“The incentive for state welfare agencies
to [underprovide services] . . . does not rise to the level we would customarily associate
with rent-seeking private corporations.”). But cf. Minow, supra note 119, at 1258
(arguing that public failures support experimentation with privatization).
187
See Bezdek, supra note 168, at 1606 (outlining the concern that “private vendors
may lack the norms of public service and of professionalism, which characterize many
public bureaucracies”).
188
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) (citing J.M. Wedemeyer & Percy
Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 326, 342 (1966)); see also supra
Section I.A.
185
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utilize the fair hearing process to defend against erroneous deprivations. Two changes in particular have rendered the fair hearing right
almost meaningless in many situations: the higher proportion of welfare recipients who are holding a job while collecting benefits, and the
lower proportion of recipients who are able to secure free legal representation at a fair hearing.
1. Work Requirements Undermine the Right to a Fair Hearing
One of the most visible differences in the circumstances of welfare
recipients since the 1970s is the higher proportion of recipients who
are employed in the low-wage workforce. Collecting benefits while
holding a job presents new obstacles to welfare recipients seeking to
exercise their right to a fair hearing. Although some welfare recipients held jobs prior to Goldberg, and those recipients faced similar
189
problems, the proportion of recipients in such a situation has in190
creased considerably since 1970.
Of all the substantive and symbolic changes to welfare caused by
the 1996 welfare law, perhaps most significant was its focus on work
requirements. The idea that recipients should work in exchange for
their benefits was not unprecedented before 1996; indeed, the federal
191
government formally established work requirements in the 1960s,
189

See, e.g., KORNBLUH, supra note 66, at 79 (noting that in the 1960s, in order for a
welfare recipient to exercise her fair hearing right, “a mother had to get time off from
her job, if she had paid work, or find a babysitter”).
190
Compare Mildred Rein, Determinants of the Work-Welfare Choice in AFDC, 46 SOC.
SERV. REV. 539, 544 (1972) (“[T]he proportion of AFDC mothers who combine work
and welfare has remained the same: from 13 to 14 percent from 1961 to 1971.”), with
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES
PROGRAM (TANF): EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at IV-29 (2009), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/annualreport8/TANF_8th_Report_
111908.pdf (“The employment rate of adults receiving TANF cash assistance . . . has
also increased significantly, up from less than one in five adults in Fiscal Year (FY) 1991
to almost one of every three adults in FY 2006.”).
191
See HANDLER, supra note 159, at 57 (“Work requirements for welfare recipients
were a state and local concern until late 1967, when the federal government enacted
the Work Incentive Program.”); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP:
REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 64 (2008) (“In 1967, with the Work
Incentive Program (WIN)—now known as workfare—the federal government revived
work as a precondition of relief.”); Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 471, 478 (1997) (“Since 1967, Congress has required states to condition AFDC
benefits upon compliance with work requirements.” (footnotes omitted)). The
Supreme Court upheld the use of mandatory work requirements in 1973. See N.Y. State
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 420-23 (1973) (holding that states are
permitted to impose work requirements in addition to those imposed by federal law so
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and the Family Support Act of 1988 placed additional emphasis on
192
helping recipients transition from welfare to work. Nonetheless, pre1996 work requirements served largely symbolic functions without
193
greatly affecting the experience of most recipients.
Since 1996, states have faced financial penalties if a minimum per194
centage of adult recipients do not engage in “work activity” for a
195
federally specified minimum number of hours each year. Although
the availability of caseload reduction credits enabled states to dodge
the full impact of the federal work requirements between 1996 and
196
2005, almost every state established or strengthened its own requirements that welfare recipients work in exchange for their bene197
fits.
And, because the caseload reduction credit benchmark was

long as the additional requirements do not present a substantial conflict with the
federal statute).
192
See HANDLER, supra note 159, at 76-88 (discussing the Family Support Act’s work
program, Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program ( JOBS)); MICHAEL B.
KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN
AMERICA 307-09 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing the debate over and ultimate passage of the
Family Support Act). Prior to 1996, the federal government also used the waiver
process to indirectly express its growing preference for work requirements. See Joel F.
Handler, “Ending Welfare As We Know It”—Wrong For Welfare, Wrong for Poverty, 2 GEO. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 3 (1994) (“Many states, under waivers from the Reagan,
Bush, and . . . Clinton Administrations . . . instituted work requirements . . . .”).
193
See generally HANDLER, supra note 159, at 56-88 (surveying the history and impact
of work requirements in American welfare policy).
194
Federal law requires that recipients engage in one or more of twelve specified
work activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(d) (2006) (defining “work activities” to include
employment, work experience, on-the-job training, job search and job readiness
assistance, community service programs, vocational educational training, job skills
training, education directly related to employment, secondary education, and the
provision of child care services); see also Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J.
1131, 1138-48 (2006) (discussing how TANF defines “work”).
195
To be considered engaged in work for a particular month in fiscal year 2000 or
thereafter, a recipient must participate in work activities for an average of at least thirty
hours per week during that month. 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(A). If the recipient is a
single parent with a child under age six, the participation requirement drops to an
average of at least twenty hours per week. Id. § 607(c)(2)(B). A state may not reduce
or terminate benefits if the recipient is a single parent with a child under six years old
and the state determines that the recipient is unable to obtain needed child care. Id.
§ 607(e)(2).
196
See supra subsection II.A.2.
197
Indeed, approximately ninety percent of families receiving cash assistance
through state welfare programs that are not governed by TANF’s work requirements
(i.e., “separate state programs”) are nonetheless required by the state to work. See U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 160, at 15; see also Michaels, supra note 126, at
600-04 (arguing that state discretion over welfare policy is limited by the the substantive
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198

reset beginning in 2006, states are again facing meaningful federal
work requirements.
As a result of PRWORA’s work requirements and the growing consensus that welfare recipients should be required to work, the proportion of welfare recipients who hold a job while collecting benefits has
199
risen significantly.
In its most recent report to Congress, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services reported that 32.5% of all
families receiving TANF benefits in 2006 satisfied the federal work
requirements, with an additional 14.4% engaging in work activities but
200
falling short of the required number of hours. During this time period, state work participation rates ranged from a high of 79.2% to a
201
low of 13.1%.
Of the families that met the work requirements,
55.1% did so through “unsubsidized employment”—in other words,
202
they worked in paid employment while also receiving welfare benefits.
Individuals who receive welfare while also holding a job face significant barriers to exercising their fair hearing right. Fair hearings are
held on weekdays during regular business hours. Although the hearing itself may not last very long, much of the day can be spent traveling
203
to and from the hearing and waiting for it to begin. Because many
low-wage workers have shifts that cannot be broken up, missing any
part of the workday means that they lose their entire shift and wages
they cannot afford to do without. In addition, employers in low-wage
sectors are not typically sympathetic to requests for time off, nor do

federal goals of PRWORA, including the goal of facilitating the transition from welfare
to work).
198
Beginning in 2006, the caseload reduction credit benchmark was changed from
a state’s 1995 caseload level to its 2005 caseload level. See Deficit Reduction Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7102(a)(1)(B), 120 Stat. 4, 136-37 (2006) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 607(b)(3)(A)(ii)). However, as previously described, 2009 legislation effectively
excused states from the penalties. See supra note 160.
199
See supra note 190.
200
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 190, at 19. To count
toward a state’s work participation rate, a family must include an adult or minor headof-household who is engaged in qualified work activities for at least thirty hours per
week, or twenty hours per week if she has a child under the age of six. Id.
201
Id. app. 360 tbl.3:2.
202
Id. app. 368 tbl.3:8.
203
See, e.g., Vicki Lens, Confronting Government After Welfare Reform: Moralists, Reformers,
and Narratives of (Ir)responsibility at Administrative Fair Hearings, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 563,
573 (2009) (noting that the wait for hearings to begin in one county “is unpredictable
and, depending on how long each hearing takes, can be short or very long”).

Parkin FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)

1352

4/10/2012 5:59 PM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 160: 1309
204

they grant workers control over their schedules.
Even having to
explain to an employer why the time off is necessary exposes recipients
to the stigma associated with welfare recipiency, which could diminish
the employer’s confidence in the recipient and limit future employ205
Thus, employed recipients who want to
ment opportunities.
challenge the termination of their benefits are likely to face a dilemma: attending a fair hearing will not only cost them a full day’s pay
206
and the expense of traveling to and from the hearing site, but may
also place their jobs in jeopardy. For many employed welfare recipients, these risks outweigh the value of whatever benefits they could win
207
at the fair hearing.
2. Reduced Access to Legal Services Undermines
the Right to a Fair Hearing
The circumstances facing welfare recipients have also changed
since the 1970s insofar as recipients now find it nearly impossible to
obtain free legal representation for a fair hearing. Goldberg guaranteed
that welfare recipients be permitted to appear with counsel at a fair
208
hearing, but not the right to be provided counsel by the govern-

204

See KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE : PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 98 (2011) (“Since the jobs [welfare recipients] can
obtain are marginal, they do not have control over what their schedules will be.”).
205
Super, supra note 102, at 853 (“Workers . . . may be more vulnerable to stigma if
identified as recipients of means-tested benefits since they could face fairly immediate,
concrete consequences: the loss of their employers’ confidence and the opportunities
that go with it.”).
206
See id. at 832-34 (positing a hypothetical to demonstrate the substantial costs
associated with attending hearings).
207
See Super, supra note 89, at 1088 (“Working claimants may lose more in wages
(and their employer’s good will) by attending [a fair hearing] than they would win
from a successful result.”). The value of the benefits recipients could win at the
hearing has also diminished since Goldberg in light of the sharp decline in the real value
of welfare grants. A recent report summarized the decline:
In all but two states, [cash assistance] benefit levels are now below 1996 levels,
after adjusting for inflation, and these declines came on top of even larger declines over the previous quarter century; between 1970 and 1996, cash assistance benefit levels for poor families with children fell by more than 40 percent
in real terms in two-thirds of the states.
IFE FINCH & LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TANF BENEFITS
FELL FURTHER IN 2011 AND ARE WORTH MUCH LESS THAN IN 1996 IN MOST STATES 1
(2011) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/11-21-11pov.pdf.
208
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
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209

ment.
Welfare recipients therefore generally have two options: attempt to secure free representation from a legal services office or ap210
Although there was never a time when all welfare
pear pro se.
recipients who sought a lawyer were able to find one, the availability of
free legal representation for fair hearings has diminished in recent
decades, with major consequences for the effectiveness of the right to
a fair hearing.
Goldberg held that due process was satisfied by an adversarial, legalistic procedural safeguard—the fair hearing—at a time when the availability of free legal services was increasing and fair hearing represen211
tation was considered central to the work of legal services lawyers.
Although the federal government had only begun funding legal ser212
vices for the poor in 1965, by 1970, the year Goldberg was decided, the
Supreme Court could reasonably anticipate that legal services funding
213
would continue to grow. In fact, that is exactly what happened during the decade after Goldberg. Despite being subject to much political
209

See id. at 270 (“We do not say that counsel must be provided at the
pretermination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an
attorney if he so desires.”). Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion in Goldberg, asserted
that even though the majority decision “requires only the opportunity to have the
benefit of counsel at the administrative hearing, . . . it is difficult to believe that the
same reasoning process would not require the appointment of counsel.” Id. at 278
(Black, J., dissenting). That prediction has not come true.
210
It is exceedingly rare for private attorneys to handle welfare fair hearings, either
for a fee or pro bono. See Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem
of Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1573 (2002)
(“[L]awyers looking for a good profit margin dismiss the poor as potential clients.”);
Super, supra note 89, at 1094 n.191 (“Although a substantial number of lawyers and law
firms engage in pro bono representation of low-income people, few are attracted to, or
are immediately competent to handle, cases involving complex public-benefit
programs.”).
211
See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 188-89 (1974) (detailing the growth of legal
services between 1965 to 1972). Despite this growth, at the time Goldberg was decided,
the Nixon administration was seeking to cut funding for legal services. See id. at 278-79
(noting that “more money for poor people seems antithetical to the Nixon policies”
and that the legal services movement had entered a new phase of “survival”).
212
See id. at 39-70 (tracing the origins of federal funding for legal services). The
now-defunct Office of Economic Opportunity controlled the federal funding of legal
services until 1974, when responsibility for coordinating the federal government’s
involvement in legal services was shifted to the Legal Services Corporation. See ALAN W.
HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE
FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 19-22
(2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0158.pdf.
213
See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 212, at 11 (“The legal services budget grew
slowly but steadily from the initial $25 million in 1966 to $71.5 million in 1972.”).
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wrangling during the 1970s, legal services funding increased steadily
until reaching its high-water mark in 1981, when the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) for the first time met its “minimum access” goal of
214
Since then, fedtwo full-time lawyers for every 10,000 poor people.
215
eral legal services funding has fallen well below that goal, with the
216
217
deepest cuts occurring in 1982 and 1995. The most recent appro218
priation was $404.2 million, a far cry from the $750 million that
219
would reflect the 1980 allocation adjusted for inflation, and far less
still than if the appropriation were adjusted for both inflation and the
larger number of poor people living in the United States.
As the overall availability of free legal services has declined, legal
services programs have shifted their resources away from representing
welfare recipients at fair hearings and toward other legal issues affecting low-income individuals. In 1983, 5.4% of LSC programs’ closed
220
cases involved AFDC or “other welfare” programs; that portion
214

Id. at 24. That year, Congress allocated a record $321.3 million to the LSC,
funding 325 programs that operated in 1450 neighborhood and rural offices
throughout all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Micronesia, and Guam. Id.
215
Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens: Proof, Social Justice, and Public Assistance Administrative
Hearings, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 133 (2008) (“[F]ederal grants to
provide civil legal services to low-income clients have been drastically reduced over the
last twenty-five years . . . .”).
216
The decline in funding was most dramatic in 1982, when Congress’s 25% cut to
LSC’s budget resulted in the closing of 285 legal services offices and layoffs of 1793
attorneys and 952 paralegals. Id. at 133 n.13 (citing LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2003–2004
ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2004), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/
pdfs/LSC_20032004_Annual_Report.pdf).
217
See Super, supra note 89, at 1094 (“In 1995, the new Republican majority in
Congress slashed legal services’ funding . . . .”); Zietlow, supra note 119, at 39 (explaining
that in the mid-1990s, “Congress ha[d] drastically cut funding to the LSC”).
218
Press Release, Legal Serv. Corp., House Proposal Would Cut Civil Legal Aid by
$104 Million ( July 6, 2011), http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/house-proposalwould-cut-civil-legal-aid-104-million. The House Appropriations Committee recently
announced a proposal that would cut LSC funding by 26% for Fiscal Year 2012, rolling
back LSC funding to a level not seen since 1999. Id.
219
Marcia Coyle, For LSC, a 30-Year Funding Rollercoaster, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 14, 2011,
at 13. Despite the focus on LSC-funded legal services, it must be noted that overall
funding for civil legal assistance has evolved since the 1970s. As of 2010, the nation’s
civil legal assistance system was funded at $1.5 billion, approximately two-thirds of
which came from nonfederal sources. See ALAN HOUSEMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
THE JUSTICE GAP: CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TODAY AND TOMORROW 7 (2011) available at
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/justice.pdf. However, very little of the
nonfederal funding is used for welfare hearing representation. See id. at 3 (not including
welfare among the major catagories of assistance providers of civil legal aid offer).
220
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 1984 FACT BOOK, at 17 (1984).
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221

dropped to 3.5% in 1995, and in 2010 only 1.9% of closed cases
involved TANF and state and local income-maintenance-related pro222
And although already miniscule, the 2010 figure overstates
grams.
the availability of free legal representation for welfare fair hearings:
less than one-twelfth of the TANF cases closed during that year
223
Thus, as David
involved representation at a hearing or in court.
Super recently observed, the overall decline in legal services funding
and the shifting priorities of legal services programs means that representation at welfare fair hearings has been “claiming a declining share
224
of a shrinking pie.”
As a result of these changes in legal services funding and priorities,
the proportion of welfare recipients who appear at fair hearings with225
out a lawyer is higher than was anticipated in 1970. This decline in
the availability of legal representation at fair hearings undermines the
effectiveness of the right to a fair hearing and weakens its capacity to
226
serve as a meaningful procedural safeguard. Although fair hearings
227
are less formal than full-blown trials, recipients who do not have access to legal counsel must overcome numerous barriers in order to successfully advocate for themselves at a hearing. For example, pro se
228
recipients must navigate complex and opaque procedures and make
221

LEGAL SERVS. CORP., FACTS 1996, at 15 (1997).
See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., FACT BOOK 2010, at 24 (2011).
223
Id. at 21. The vast majority of cases involved what LSC refers to as “counsel and
advice” or “limited action,” neither of which includes representation at a hearing. Id.
224
Super, supra note 89, at 1095.
225
See Brodoff, supra note 215, at 133 (asserting that cuts to legal services funding
since 1980 have left welfare recipients “virtually without representation in the
administrative hearing process”); see also id. (“The vast majority of clients who disagree
with the state or federal agency’s decision to cut, deny or eliminate benefits must face
the agency alone, put on evidence, argue the law—in sum, make their case to the
judge.”).
226
Cf. Jan L. Hagen, Justice for the Welfare Recipient: Another Look at Welfare Fair
Hearings, 57 SOC. SERV. REV. 177, 184 (1983) (“Petitioners who retained counsel were
more likely to use the available due process procedures, particularly cross-examination
and the presentation of arguments.” (citations omitted)).
227
Cf. Friendly, supra note 42, at 1299 (“After the usual litany that the required
hearing ‘need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial,’ Mr. Justice Brennan
proceeded to demand almost all the elements of one.” (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 266 (1970))).
228
See, e.g., Brodoff, supra note 215, at 149 (“[T]he administrative hearing process
is difficult for appellants to navigate. It can be a scary, intimidating, and complex
process that involves court-like procedures, public speaking, motion practice, entry of
exhibits, objections to evidence, and an understanding of complicated laws and
procedures.” (footnotes omitted)).
222
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229

sense of an array of welfare laws, regulations, and policies.
At the
same time, they must contend with the effects of poverty, including
poor health or disability, lack of access to transportation or childcare,
230
Many
poor nutrition, little education, and inadequate housing.
post-Goldberg recipients also must overcome a lack of English language
231
Despite the resourcefulness and tenacity of many welfare
fluency.
recipients, it comes as no surprise that recipients who proceed without
counsel at a fair hearing are much less likely to successfully challenge
232
erroneous deprivations.
C. New Technology
The changes in technology that have reshaped American society in
so many ways since the 1970s have also affected the procedural safeguards available to welfare recipients. At the time Goldberg was decided, automation was not part of the day-to-day administration of welfare
233
programs. Caseworkers made eligibility determinations by hand and
all records were kept in paper files. When welfare recipients challenged benefit terminations at fair hearings, the welfare agency could
produce the relevant documents for review by the recipient or the
judge prior to or during the fair hearing. If the documents did not
229

See, e.g., id. at 153 (“[P]ublic benefits law is so complex that it is virtually
unreadable by the lay person.”); Lens, supra note 66, at 35 (“Welfare rules are complex,
and unknotting bureaucratic mistakes out of the typical agency’s mound of rules,
directives, and manuals can be extremely difficult.”); Super, supra note 89, at 1096
(stating that public benefits programs have become so complex and discretionary that
“claimants are in no position to challenge [agency actions]”).
230
See, e.g., Brodoff, supra note 215, at 150; Lens, supra note 66, at 35
(“Discrepancies may exist between clients’ educational and literacy levels and the skills
needed to navigate the fair hearing process.”); cf. Mashaw, supra note 100, at 812
(arguing that is it unrealistic to imagine a claimant will be “prepared to fight city hall
even when basic entitlement to benefits is at issue”).
231
See, e.g., Brodoff, supra note 215, at 151-52 (“Even assuming excellent translation
services, unrepresented non-English speaking applicants can have difficulty
understanding the administrative hearing system, the law that applies, and how to
present their case.”).
232
See Zietlow, supra note 119, at 39-40 (“Statistics show that poor people are more
likely to prevail in hearings if they are represented by counsel . . . .” (citing Zietlow,
supra note 130, at 1114 nn.13-15)). But cf. D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos
Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation
(Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 2012) (manuscript at 4967), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708664 (arguing that previous attempts to
measure representation effects provide virtually no credible quantitative information
on the effect of an offer or actual use of legal representation).
233
Super, supra note 89, at 1123.
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provide the necessary information, the recipient’s caseworker or another agency representative could be called to testify in order to explain the challenged decision.
During the decades since Goldberg, new technologies have been integrated into many aspects of the administration of welfare pro234
grams.
Many state and local welfare agencies now use computer
systems to streamline application procedures and eligibility determinations, improve fraud prevention and detection, and reduce the stigma
235
associated with receiving welfare benefits. In some welfare agencies,
computers are not just assisting caseworkers with the processing of
cases; they are actually deciding who receives benefits and in what
236
amounts.
Despite its many advantages, increased reliance on technology is also
changing how welfare is administered in ways that threaten recipients’
ability to successfully challenge erroneous terminations at fair hearings. Merely identifying the rules and policies that were applied in a
given case can be difficult, as complex computer programming and
coding may hide the legal basis for eligibility determinations. As a result, recipients, judges presiding over fair hearings and even the agency’s own representatives may be unable to evaluate whether the
237
determination was erroneous.
In addition to obscuring the legal basis for welfare agency decisionmaking, highly automated welfare systems can also create new
sources of factual errors. For example, New York City’s welfare agency
234

See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1267 (2008) (observing that “agencies today increasingly use computer systems to
make decisions”).
235
See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, supra note 204, at 40, 56-59 (discussing the use of
technology for welfare fraud prevention); Kennedy, supra note 86, at 251
(“Technology . . . promises to transform the welfare system. Advocates of mass
technological innovation promise foolproof fraud prevention mechanisms, accurate
and uniform distribution of benefits through EBT systems, and faster and easier
procedures to claim benefits.”); Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand
Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 663, 692-93, 708-09 (2005) (discussing use of “computermatching” systems to verify welfare eligibility).
236
See Super, supra note 89, at 1123 (stating that due to the adoption of highly
automated systems, “eligibility workers [are] not in fact making most of the important
decisions relating to claimants’ eligibility”).
237
See Citron, supra note 234, at 1300 (“[A] system’s design may create unreviewable
problems for individuals.”); see also Super, supra note 89, at 1124 (“Although policymakers
and line staff may assume that the system is carrying out the same policies expressed in
the program’s state plan and manuals, deviations may be difficult to detect.”).
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uses a central computer system to track recipients’ attendance at various appointments—if a recipient is found to have intentionally failed
to appear at just one appointment, state law requires that he or she be
238
Rapenalized with a loss of benefits for a specified period of time.
ther than having caseworkers record when recipients miss an appointment, however, the central computer system automatically deems
recipients to have willfully failed to attend all appointments unless a
caseworker affirmatively enters a note in the system that the recipient
239
Pursuant to this method of administration,
appeared as requested.
known as “autoposting,” all errors in the system run against the recipient rather than the welfare agency, and recipients are often faced with
losing benefits despite having attended an appointment, or having
been excused by the caseworker, because the caseworker failed to rec240
ord the attendance or excuse in the computer.
The shift toward automated eligibility determinations undermines
important assumptions that were central to the Goldberg Court’s under241
standing of fair hearings.
Without clear articulation of the legal
basis for an agency’s decision to terminate benefits, it is difficult to see
how a recipient can successfully challenge the decision at a hearing.
Moreover, the veneer of rigor and precision associated with automated
decisionmaking makes it exceedingly difficult for recipients to dispute
242
the legal and factual determinations made by computer systems.
Thus, as Danielle Keats Citron has argued, “the procedural guarantees of the last century have been overmatched by the technologies
243
of this one.”

238

N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 342 (McKinney 2003).
Hearing on N.Y. State’s TANF-Funded Welfare to Work Program Before the Assemb.
Standing Comm. on Soc. Serv., 231st Sess. 4-5 (N.Y. 2008) (testimony of Susan Welber,
Staff Att’y, Legal Aid Society), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/media/69500/
finaltestimony11_20.pdf.
240
Id.; see also Neil deMause, Documents Reveal Gaps In City Welfare Data, CITY LIMITS
( Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.citylimits.org/news/articles/4278/documents-reveal-gapsin-city-welfare-data (describing the risk of autoposting errors).
241
Citron, supra note 234, at 1281-88.
242
See id. at 1283 (arguing that “automation bias” may cause judges to be unduly
deferential to determinations made by automated systems).
243
Id. at 1258.
239
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D. New Facts and Circumstances Create Needs
for Additional Procedural Protections
The new facts and circumstances discussed in this Part, and their
impact on the right to a fair hearing, give rise to four types of new
procedural needs experienced by today’s welfare recipients. First,
there is a need for some kind of prehearing process that can identify
and overturn proposed benefit terminations that are not supported by
the facts or the law. This need emerges from the increased likelihood
of erroneous terminations resulting from post-Goldberg incentives to
244
In addition, by overturning erroneous
shrink welfare caseloads.
terminations without a formal hearing, such prehearing processes
would reduce the need for legal representation and ameliorate problems related to the inaccessibility of fair hearings for recipients who
hold a job.
Second, there is a need for increased transparency with respect to
welfare agency decisionmaking, particularly when the agency seeks to
245
Welfare
terminate benefits based on automated determinations.
agencies’ increased reliance on computer systems to keep track of information about recipients and to make eligibility determinations
generally occurs behind a veil of unintelligible computer codes and
programming. Thus, when welfare agencies seek to terminate benefits
based on the decisions of a computer system, clear explanations of the
rules and policies underlying those decisions are necessary in order to
ensure that the fair hearing right is a meaningful one.
Third, there is a need for flexibility with respect to the scheduling
of fair hearings. With a higher proportion of welfare recipients holding jobs while collecting benefits, limiting fair hearings to regular
business hours renders hearings inaccessible for many recipients who
246
For
are dutifully complying with their welfare work requirements.
these recipients, a meaningful procedure is one that does not force
them to choose between attending a hearing and keeping their job.
And fourth, there is a need for modifications to the fair hearing
process that will enable recipients to participate meaningfully without
legal representation. With no real hope of a court-ordered right to

244
245
246

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra subsection II.B.1.
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247

counsel at welfare fair hearings, and little reason to believe that legal
services funding will increase to the extent necessary to enable most
248
welfare recipients to be represented by counsel at fair hearings, the
vast majority of recipients facing benefit terminations will do so without the assistance of a lawyer. For the right to a fair hearing to be an
effective procedural safeguard against erroneous deprivations, the fair
hearing process must become more accessible to recipients who do
not have access to legal counsel.
As a result of the various types of changes discussed in this Part,
today’s welfare recipients will likely experience some or all of the four
needs identified above. The following Part examines the capacity of
procedural due process to adapt to these changes and explores some
possible procedural innovations that respond to the needs these
changes have created.
III. ADAPTABLE DUE PROCESS: HOW DUE PROCESS CAN RESPOND
TO CHANGING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
Despite numerous changes in the facts and circumstances related
to welfare terminations since the 1970s, little attention has been paid
to whether the demands of procedural due process should adapt to
those changes. Considering the adaptability of due process raises two
distinct questions. First, what does due process doctrine say about the
viability of procedural due process precedents when the facts and circumstances related to a particular deprivation have changed? And
second, what are possible additional or substitute procedural safeguards
that might be appropriate if existing procedures must be adapted to
new realities? This Part takes up those questions in turn and then concludes by considering the limits of procedural due process.
A. Adaptation and Due Process Doctrine
The world is constantly changing, and at least some of those
changes are likely to be relevant to the fact-intensive Mathews balanc247

See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516-17 (2011); Benjamin H. Barton &
Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 967, 970 (2012) (“Turner dealt a death blow to hopes for a federal civil
Gideon.”). But cf. Stephen Loffredo & Don Friedman, Gideon Meets Goldberg: The Case
for a Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 TOURO L. R EV. 273, 307-12 (2009)
(arguing that state legislatures have an independent constitutional duty to recognize and
fund a qualified right to appointed counsel in welfare hearings).
248
See supra subsection II.B.2.
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ing approach to procedural due process. Yet the Supreme Court has
not addressed the question of when procedures that satisfied the demands of due process in the past may be rendered unconstitutional by
changes in the facts and circumstances related to a deprivation. Notwithstanding the existence of any such changes, the Court’s due process precedents, however outdated, remain good law, and government
249
agencies continue to regard them as binding.
Because the Court has not been presented with challenges to existing procedural due process precedents based on changed facts and
circumstances, due process case law does not address how courts
should handle such challenges. Two recent district court decisions in
New York expose this lack of guidance. As discussed in this Article’s
Introduction, Huggins v. Pataki and Mayers v. New York Community Bancorp involved due process challenges to New York State debt collection
procedures that the Second Circuit had found constitutional approx250
imately twenty years earlier in McCahey v. L.P. Investors. The plaintiffs
in both cases argued that the Second Circuit’s decision in McCahey was
no longer binding because intervening changes in facts and circumstances had altered the balance of the Mathews factors, and, therefore,
the district court was required to redo the Mathews analysis and determine the constitutionality of the procedures based on the new infor251
The district judge in Huggins refused to reevaluate the
mation.
252
Mathews factors in light of the new facts and dismissed the case.
Three years later, however, the district judge in Mayers disagreed with
his colleague and proceeded to engage in a full Mathews analysis, tak249

Continued adherence to procedures dictated by prior due process precedents
might be explained by the existence of statutes or regulations that implemented those
precedents. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 358-5.0 to 358-5.11 (West,
Westlaw through 2011) (outlining welfare fair hearing procedures in New York). But it
is also true that legislatures and agencies have not attempted to rewrite such statutes
and regulations.
250
See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text.
251
See Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. 03-CV-5837, 2005 WL 2105810, at
*12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (“Plaintiffs contend that since the McCahey decision in
1985, changes in technology which have enabled the electronic transfer of funds allow
banks ‘to quickly and easily determine if an account contains only exempt money prior
to restraining it,’ without any kind of pre-seizure notice to the debtor.”); Huggins v.
Pataki, No. 01-CV-3016, 2002 WL 1732804, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002) (“Huggins
does not dispute this reading of McCahey. He argues, however, that intervening
changes in technology have undermined the rationale for the McCahey decision, and
that it is therefore distinguishable.”).
252
See Huggins, 2002 WL 1732804, at *4 (“McCahey is binding authority, and I am
obligated to apply that authority.”).
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ing into consideration the changes alleged by the plaintiffs and holding that the plaintiffs stated a due process claim notwithstanding the
253
The conflicting reasoning and
existence of the McCahey decision.
outcomes in Huggins and Mayers underscore the need for guidance on
whether and how procedural due process precedents should be
adapted to our changing world.
Although the Supreme Court has not been faced with a similar type
of due process challenge, the Court’s general approach to procedural
due process claims offers clues as to what due process would demand
in such a situation. Indeed, as discussed below, current due process
doctrine strongly suggests that requiring procedural safeguards to
adapt to changing facts and circumstances is faithful to the Court’s
understanding of the dictates of procedural due process.
The notion that the requirements of due process may evolve over
time has deep roots in Supreme Court jurisprudence. As early as
1884, the Court rejected the argument that the Framers’ understanding of the Due Process Clause limits the scope of procedures required
254
by the Clause. As Justice Felix Frankfurter later explained, the concept of due process is, “perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law—
the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social
255
Indeed, procedural rules, “even
standards of a progressive society.”
256
ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due process.”
253

See id. at *13-14 (holding that the new facts alleged by the plaintiffs altered the
second and third factors of the Mathews balancing test).
254
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884) (expressing fear that
establishing a fixed definition of due process “stamp[s] upon our jurisprudence the
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians”).
255
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
judgment). According to Justice Frankfurter:
“[D]ue process” cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any
formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man,
and more particularly between the individual and government, “due process” is
compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is
not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
256
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 630 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment). Although history creates a strong presumption of continued validity,
“the Court has the authority under the [Fourteenth] Amendment to examine even
traditionally accepted procedures and declare them invalid.” Id. at 628 (White, J.,
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Thus, “due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical concep257
tion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”
More specifically, the Court has long held that “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situa258
tion demands.”
Consistent with this understanding of due process,
the Court evaluates challenged procedures on a case-by-case basis, with
the constitutionality of the procedures dependent on the facts of the
259
Since 1976, the three-factor balancing approach adopted
situation.
by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge has supplied the framework for re260
viewing the constitutionality of particular procedural safeguards. In
addition to the three factors, the Mathews Court noted that due process requires procedures to be “tailored, in light of the decision to be
made, to ‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard,’ to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to pre261
Considered alongside the Mathews factors, the taisent their case.”
loring requirement further reinforces the fact-specific nature of the
procedural due process inquiry.
Although the Court has not had an opportunity to reconsider postMathews procedural due process rulings in light of changing circumstances, it has addressed similar concerns in areas of due process that

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 206 (1977)); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819)
(“[The] constitution [was] intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” (emphasis omitted)).
257
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334 (1976)).
258
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). As the Court noted in Morrissey,
“It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority
that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.” Id.; see also supra note 1.
259
See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (“[W]e generally have declined
to establish rigid rules and instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the
sufficiency of particular procedures.”).
260
424 U.S. at 334-35 (1976). But cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 66 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that the Court did not adhere to “the notion that the Mathews balancing
test constitutes a ‘one-size-fits-all’ formula for deciding every due process claim that
comes before the Court” (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992))).
261
424 U.S. at 349 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970)). The
Court first recognized the need for tailoring in Goldberg, where it explained that
procedures must be “adapted to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients.”
397 U.S. at 267; see also White, supra note 97, at 878 (discussing the Goldberg Court’s
“willingness to probe beneath formalist assumptions, to inform itself about the realities
of poor people’s lives”).
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are not governed by Mathews. In the realm of personal jurisdiction, for
262
example, the Court’s precedent evolved from Pennoyer v. Neff to In263
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington based in part on the need to adapt
personal jurisdiction rules to changes in the circumstances of liti264
This evolution is likely to continue as the rise of Internetgants.
based communication calls into question the ongoing constitutionality
265
of decades-old personal jurisdiction rules.
Other changes in due
process doctrine may also be understood as responses to changed cir266
cumstances rather than simple reversals of precedent.
In sum, the Court’s consistent invocation of the flexibility of due
process provides strong doctrinal support for requiring that procedural safeguards adapt to changing facts and circumstances. To be sure,
the Court’s rejection of a one-size-fits-all approach to due process has
come in the context of reaffirming the general proposition that due
process can require different procedures for different types of deprivations. As such, the Court has left unaddressed whether due process
262

See 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). The Court held that a court can exert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident only if that party is served with process while physically
present within the state or that party’s in-state property had been attached at the
beginning of the litigation. Id. The Court further explained that court proceedings “to
determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.” Id.
263
See 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that due process requires only that an
individual have “certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’” (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
264
The Court explained this shift in Hanson v. Denckla:
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States,
the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase.
At the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made
the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to
these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents
have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff to the flexible standard of
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.
357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (citations omitted).
265
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World: Voice Over
Internet Protocol and the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1481, 1542 (2006).
266
For example, one might explain the Court’s reversal of its position on whether
public employment is a property right protected by due process as influenced by the
growth and regularization of public employment between 1961 and 1985. Compare
Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)
(holding that public employment can be revoked without a hearing), with Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985) (holding that public employees
possess a property right in continued employment).
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can require different procedures for the same type of deprivation oc267
Any uncurring at a different time under different circumstances.
certainty about how courts should handle such due process challenges
will remain until the Court is asked to revisit one of its existing procedural due process precedents and reevaluate the Mathews factors based
268
Until then, the Court’s preceon changed facts and circumstances.
dent concerning the flexibility of due process and the need for consid269
as well as the
eration of the “time, place and circumstances”
270
“capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,” and its
requirement that the opportunity to be heard be “at a meaningful time
271
and in a meaningful manner,” weigh in favor of an approach to procedural due process that requires adaptation to changed facts and circumstances.
B. Identifying Forms of Additional or Substitute Procedural Safeguards
Once due process is understood to require reconsideration of existing procedural due process precedents, courts must then determine
what additional or substitute procedures would satisfy due process in
the new, changed circumstances. In the welfare context, the changes
267

A related question is whether the requirements of procedural due process vary
depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular person who is seeking to
challenge a deprivation, or if those requirements ought to be standardized with respect
to all persons challenging that deprivation. For an example of one answer, see Owen
M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 801-03 (1990), which argues
that the Court’s approach must systematically consider the welfare system as a whole.
The Court’s rulings have not answered this question in a consistent fashion. Compare
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1977) (explaining that the level of process
due is based on the typical case), with Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25
(1981) (requiring analysis of the facts of each individual case to determine the
requirements of due process).
268
To the extent that revisiting procedural due process precedents may raise stare
decisis concerns, such concerns do not appear to be particularly relevant in this
context. Due process challenges of the type described here will be based on facts that
are distinguishable from those previously considered. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has recognized that its decision to overrule a prior case may be informed by
“whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or justification.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
269
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334 (1976)).
270
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
271
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
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identified in Part II of this Article suggest that the risk of erroneous
termination has increased substantially since the 1970s, while at the
same time welfare recipients now have a more difficult time using fair
hearings to challenge those terminations. Thus, there appears to be a
need for additional procedural safeguards that are tailored to the current realities of welfare programs and welfare recipients.
In order to respond directly to the new facts and circumstances discussed in Sections II.A through C, this Section is organized according
to the new procedural needs created by those changes and identified
in Section II.D. Although some of the procedures discussed below are
likely beyond the scope of what a court could or would order as part of
a Mathews analysis, nothing would prevent a welfare agency from
adopting the procedures. Indeed, to the extent that the procedures
reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation, they could insulate a state
from liability in a future due process challenge.
1. Pre–Fair Hearing Procedures
Adoption of prehearing screening and informal dispute resolution
procedures could relieve much of the pressure to overturn erroneous
272
terminations that is currently borne by the fair hearing system. Such
procedures could involve the welfare agency affirmatively reaching out
to the recipient after the agency decides to terminate benefits, rather
than merely assuming that the basis for the termination is correct and
273
then waiting to see if the recipient requests a fair hearing. The pur272

Despite the appeal of using prehearing informal dispute resolution procedures
to screen out erroneous terminations, some scholars have argued that relying on such
procedures to resolve disputes may disadvantage the poor. See, e.g., Lens, supra note 66,
at 53 (“[C]aution is warranted for using alternative and less formal procedures for
resolving disputes within the welfare center. Such procedures may work against poorer
and more disadvantaged clients, who may lose procedural protections that compensate
for their lack of power.”); cf. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing
the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1396
(describing how informal processes allow the state to exercise coercive power over the
poor who would otherwise be protected in formal proceedings); Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (arguing that poor litigants suffer from a
power imbalance in negotiations).
273
This has long been the general rule with respect to applications for food stamp
benefits. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d)(1) (2011) (“If there is any question as to whether the
household has merely failed to cooperate, as opposed to refused to cooperate, the
household shall not be denied, and the agency shall provide assistance . . . .”); id.
§ 273.2(c)(5) (defining the “assistance” required by 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d)(1) to include a
notice informing the household of, among other things, the state agency’s
“responsibility to assist the household in obtaining required verification”).
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pose of this contact would be twofold: to determine if the recipient in
fact willfully failed to comply with the rules, and, if so, whether the recipient will agree to come into compliance immediately.
Such a prehearing procedure was implemented in Tennessee starting in January 1998. This process—known as Customer Service Review
(CSR)—arose after Tennessee’s welfare caseload shrank by almost
thirty-eight percent in the year following enactment of the 1996
274
Concerned that this reduction was attributable
federal welfare law.
to widespread caseworker error and recipient misunderstanding,
lawyers at the Tennessee Justice Center contemplated legal action
275
However, rather than bring a lawagainst the state welfare agency.
suit, they negotiated with state officials to create the CSR process,
which required each proposed welfare case closure or sanction to be
subject to an independent review before the agency could withhold
276
benefits from a recipient. The goal of the CSR process was to avoid
erroneous terminations of benefits, to better inform recipients of program rules, and to give recipients another opportunity to comply with
277
the rules.
278
Under the CSR process, impartial reviewers first checked to see
whether the case file included sufficient documentation to support the
279
If the
caseworker’s recommendation that benefits be terminated.
file lacked sufficient documentation, the case remained open and was
280
If the reviewer verified that the
returned to the eligibility worker.
case file supported the termination of benefits, the reviewer then contacted the recipient in order to explain the reasons for the proposed
case closure, find out from the recipient why she failed to comply with

274

Russ Overby, Customer Service Review: Tennessee’s Review Process Before Welfare
Reform Cases Are Closed, WELFARE NEWS (The Welfare Law Ctr., New York, N.Y.), Sept.
18, 1998, at 7.
275
APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., WORTHWHILE WELFARE REFORMS 2 (2001).
276
Id.
277
See Overby, supra note 274, at 8.
278
Id. The reviewers were initially Tennessee Department of Human Services
supervisors, but the process was later turned over to “contract employees hired by four
state universities in Tennessee on a regional basis, with overall training conducted by
the School of Social Work at the University of Tennessee. Contract employees [were]
not subject to the supervision of the local offices whose cases they review[ed].” Id.
279
Id. Several types of proposed case closures were not included in the review
process, including cases that were closed due to excess income or resources, recipients
moving out of state or dying, children of recipients becoming too old to qualify, and
children “already receiving cash assistance with another caretaker.” Id. at 7.
280
Id. at 8.
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the program requirements, and ask the recipient if she was willing to
281
If the recipient
come into compliance with those requirements.
complied with the rules within fourteen days, benefits were not termi282
nated. Recipients who still did not comply had their cases closed but
were also sent a notice informing them of the reasons, how they could
283
regain benefits, and the availability of emergency welfare assistance.
284
Although Tennessee discontinued the CSR process in 2006, it
posted impressive results while it was operational. Based on a two-year
sample, customer service reviewers were able to reach about half of all
recipients threatened with case closure, and two-thirds of those recipi285
ents avoided the closure by coming into compliance with the rules.
Even when a reviewer could not reach the recipient, reviewers overturned one-third of the intended case closures because there was in286
sufficient support for closure in the case file.
New York has also adopted a prehearing procedure for certain welfare cases, but the procedure differs from Tennessee’s approach in
ways that undermine its ability to avoid erroneous terminations. Welfare agencies in New York must automatically begin an informal dispute resolution process called “conciliation” whenever they decide to
reduce or terminate benefits due to a failure to comply with the work
287
rules. The agencies first mail a letter to the recipient informing her
of the alleged violation and her right to participate in a conciliation
288
The meeting is then held at a central welfare office, and
meeting.
the goal is to determine whether the failure to comply with the work

281

Id.
Id. This time period could be extended if it was “not possible to demonstrate
compliance within 14 days.” Id.
283
Id.
284
UNIV. OF TENN. COLL. OF SOC. WORK OFFICE OF RESEARCH & PUB. SERV.,
2005–2006 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2006). In its place, the Tennessee welfare agency
created an in-house “Closure Review Team,” which assumed some of the functions CSR
staff previously performed. Id.
285
Super, supra note 102, at 882 & n.197.
286
Id.
287
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 341 (McKinney 2003). The Family Support Act of 1988
required an attempt at conciliation prior to imposing a welfare sanction, but that
requirement was repealed by PRWORA. See 42 U.S.C. § 682(h) (1994) (repealed 1996)
(“Each State shall establish a conciliation procedure for the resolution of disputes
involving an individual’s participation in the [Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
Program].”).
288
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 341.1(a).
282
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289

rules was “willful and without good cause.” If the recipient establishes good cause and demonstrates that the failure was not willful, the
sanction cannot be imposed; however, if good cause is not established
or if the recipient does not attend the conciliation meeting, the agencies issue a notice informing the recipient that her benefits will be re290
duced or terminated due to the failure to comply with the rules. In
2010, New York City’s welfare agency claims that more than half of the
conciliation meetings attended by the recipient resulted in resolution of
291
the issue with no loss of benefits. Without information about the re292
cipients who do not attend their conciliation meetings, however, it is
difficult to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the process.
The prehearing procedures adopted by Tennessee and New York
have the potential to counteract some of the features of today’s welfare
system that undermine the effectiveness of the right to a fair hearing.
Yet these procedures have important differences that bear upon their
capacity to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivations. In Tennessee’s
CSR process, the reviewer made contact with the recipient by telephone and provided information and asked questions in an attempt to
resolve the problem. In contrast, the New York conciliation notice
mailed to the recipient includes little information other than a recitation of the failure to comply and information about the recipient’s
right to conciliation. In addition, unlike the CSR process, conciliation
meetings require in-person attendance, which makes it more difficult
for recipients with jobs or childcare obligations to participate. The
conciliation meetings also differ in the possible outcomes. Whereas
the CSR process allowed for resolution based on a promise to comply
immediately with the rules, conciliation meetings do not, excusing
noncompliance only if good cause is shown. Finally, Tennessee’s use
of customer service reviewers who were independent from the welfare
agency created a level of impartiality that is missing from New York’s

289

Id.; see also Fair Hearings: Overview, COMMUNITY SERVICE SOC’Y, http://
benefitsplus.cssny.org/pbm/advocacy/fair-hearings/203135#203137 (last visited Feb.
15, 2012) (describing New York City’s conciliation process for resolving work-related
welfare issues).
290
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 341.1.
291
See deMause, supra note 240 (quoting New York City Human Resources
Administration Commissioner Robert Doar’s statement that “in conciliation, during
the course of the past year, the majority of [cases] resulted in the agency being able to
settle the matter with no penalty to the client”).
292
According to the agency, it does not track the percentage of recipients that fails
to attend the conciliation meeting. Id.
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conciliation process, which is staffed by employees within the same
agency that is seeking to terminate the recipient’s benefits.
2. Transparency Regarding Automated Determinations
Decisions to terminate benefits made by welfare agencies’ computer
systems do not need to be shrouded in secrecy. Agencies could take
an important step toward transparency simply by ensuring that their
computer systems “generate audit trails that record the facts and rules
293
supporting their decisions.” These audit trails could include a comprehensive history of all decisions made in the case, including the
294
identities of the agency officials who created the factual record.
Providing audit trails to welfare recipients at the time they are notified
of a decision to terminate their benefits would enable recipients to see
the reasons supporting the automated determination, decide whether
to challenge the determination, and prepare for a fair hearing. Audit
trails would also make it easier for judges presiding over fair hearings
to assess the legality of challenged decisions, and could potentially
295
counteract the automation bias that can influence some judges.
3. Flexible Scheduling of Fair Hearings
Accommodating working welfare recipients who are unable to exercise their right to a fair hearing because they are afraid of losing
their jobs is fairly straightforward: change the way fair hearings are
scheduled. There is no reason that all fair hearings must be held
Monday through Friday, during regular business hours; indeed, some
296
civil court systems have adopted evening or weekend sessions. Allowing recipients to request evening or weekend hearings would enable
some recipients to appear at fair hearings when they otherwise would
293

Citron, supra note 234, at 1305.
Id.
295
See id. at 1305-06 (“By providing a detailed map of a computer’s decision-making
process, audit trails would encourage [hearing] officers to critically assess the
computer’s specific findings.”). Citron also proposed two strategies to combat
automation bias more directly. “First, agencies should make it clear to hearing officers
that automated systems are fallible.” Id. at 1306. “Second, agencies should require
hearing officers to explain, in detail, their reliance on an automated system’s decision.”
Id. at 1307.
296
For example, New York City’s small claims courts are in session during evening
hours one day a week. See New York City Civil Court Small Claims Part: Civil Court Schedule
and Service Changes, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
nyc/smallclaims/courtservicechanges.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
294
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not be able to do so. And even if holding fair hearings outside the
traditional workweek would be too administratively burdensome, permitting recipients to identify days or times they are unavailable and
scheduling hearings accordingly would increase the likelihood they
will appear at their fair hearings and take full advantage of their due
process rights.
4. Procedures That Are Accessible to Pro Se Recipients
There are many ways that a welfare agency could make fair hearings more accessible to pro se recipients. An agency could ensure that
recipients are provided user friendly information about the rules and
procedures governing the proposed termination of their benefits and
the fair hearing itself. Along those lines, an agency could designate
ombudspeople to help recipients understand the reasons for the im297
pending termination and how to navigate the fair hearing system. A
welfare agency could create materials for pro se recipients that provide
298
much the same information, or allow outside organizations to oper299
ate pro se help desks in welfare offices or at hearing sites.
Making
such resources and information available would mitigate the need for
recipients to consult with lawyers in order to figure out whether the

297

See Diller, supra note 61, at 1216 (suggesting an ombudsman system); cf.
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1816 (2001) (“All
jurisdictions should have comprehensive services such as free or low-cost workshops,
hotlines, court-house advisors, and walk-in centers that provide personalized
multilingual assistance at accessible times and locations.”).
298
See, e.g., RICHARD ZORZA, THE NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE SELFHELP FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE
WITHOUT LAWYERS 49 (2002), available at http://www.zorza.net/Res_ProSe_SelfHelp
CtPub.pdf (advocating for provision of accessible, user friendly information to pro se
litigants); Cantrell, supra note 210, at 1581 (discussing pro se assistance programs,
including printed self-help manuals and web-based information centers).
299
This type of pro se assistance for welfare recipients challenging terminations or
reductions of benefits already exists in New York City. Since 2001, the state agency that
administers welfare fair hearings has permitted Project FAIR, a coalition of legal
services attorneys, community advocates, and law students, to staff a help desk at the sole
hearing location in the city. See History, PROJECT FAIR, http://www.projectfair.org/
history.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). Advocates had previously tried to establish
help desks in the waiting rooms of New York City–run welfare offices, but the city
barred the advocates from entry and a First Amendment challenge to the city’s
restrictions proved unsuccessful. See Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378
F.3d 133, 139-40, 151 (2d Cir. 2004) (determining that welfare office waiting rooms are
nonpublic fora and the exclusion of an organization without official business is
reasonable).
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agency’s decision is correct and whether they should request a fair
hearing.
Welfare agencies could take advantage of technological advances
that have rendered some prehearing procedures far less costly than
they were in the past. In jurisdictions that use electronic case file systems to store information pertaining to a welfare case, agencies could
create an Internet-based mechanism for recipients to review infor300
mation relevant to the agency’s proposed termination of benefits.
Making this information available online would enable recipients to
learn the basis for the termination and decide whether to request a
fair hearing. This access would also enable recipients to better prepare for fair hearings, thereby reducing erroneous deprivations.
It is also possible to modify the fair hearing itself in ways that make
it more accessible to pro se recipients. For example, the burden of
proof on welfare agencies could be heightened in order to reduce the
301
risk of erroneous deprivation.
When terminating benefits, agencies
typically must prove that the decision is supported by a preponderance
302
In order to uncover deprivations that are not supof the evidence.
ported by the record, but which pro se recipients are unable to combat
at the hearing, agencies could be held to a more stringent “clear and
convincing” standard. Requiring the agency to prove each element of
its case beyond the traditional “preponderance of the evidence” standard would place an extra burden on welfare agencies, thereby reduc303
ing the risk that benefits would be terminated erroneously.
The federal food stamp program already uses this type of burden
shifting in some situations. Federal law requires states to follow specific

300

Although many welfare recipients likely do not have Internet access in their
homes, most can visit public libraries or other locations that offer free access. See, e.g.,
SAMANTHA BECKER ET AL., OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL: HOW THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
BENEFITS FROM INTERNET ACCESS AT U.S. LIBRARIES 19 (2010), available at http://
www.imls.gov/pdf/OpportunityForAll.pdf (“Public library computers have become a
critical resource for many underserved populations and for others who do not have
access to the Internet and computers through other means.”).
301
Outside the welfare context, the Mathews balancing test has been used to strike
down a “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof and replace it with a
“clear and convincing evidence” standard in proceedings to terminate parental rights
for neglect. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982).
302
See, e.g., Brodoff, supra note 215, at 175 (explaining that the “traditional” level of
proof required at welfare fair hearings is a “preponderance of the evidence”).
303
See id. (arguing that adopting a “clear and convincing” standard for welfare fair
hearings would ensure that “only those who are clearly ineligible for benefits would
lose them”).
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procedures when prosecuting “intentional [p]rogram violations,” or
304
food stamp fraud. Included in these procedures is a fair hearing at
which the presiding judge must make findings on each element using
305
a standard that requires clear and convincing evidence. This heightened standard of proof places an additional burden on agencies, but it
serves as an extra safeguard against erroneous determinations.
The role of the judge at welfare fair hearings is another target for
procedural reforms designed to assist pro se recipients. Rather than
passively waiting for a pro se recipient to present his or her case or respond to the agency representative’s presentation of the facts and the
306
law, the judge could play a more inquisitorial role. Such a role could
take a variety of forms. For example, the judge could be required to
explain to the recipient the basis for the termination and possible defenses, or to develop the record by asking the recipient a series of
questions probing whether any defenses might be available or whether
there is some other reason why the termination is erroneous.
The Supreme Court has already endorsed the idea that due process
may require judges to assume an active role in legal proceedings involving unrepresented parties, albeit outside the context of welfare fair
hearings. The Court has long required that judges in civil proceedings
evaluate pro se parties’ pleadings using a less stringent standard than

304

7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e) (2011).
See id. § 273.16(e)(6) (“The hearing authority shall base the determination of
intentional [p]rogram violation on clear and convincing evidence which demonstrates
that the household member(s) committed, and intended to commit, intentional
[p]rogram violation . . . .”).
306
See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 42, at 1289 (proposing experimentation with an
investigative or inquisitorial system in which an impartial administrative law judge
assumes “a much more active role with respect to the course of the hearing; for
example, he would examine the parties, might call his own experts if needed, request
that certain types of evidence be presented, and, if necessary, aid the parties in
acquiring that evidence”); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented
Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987,
2028 (1999) (identifying the need for a judge to be “as active as necessary” to ensure a
just outcome in cases involving pro se litigants); Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality
in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why
Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 977-78 (2004) (arguing
that “judges should be active umpires,” policing procedural errors that limit the court’s
access to relevant evidence and cogent arguments); see also Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring
Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in
New York City’s Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659, 670-76 (2006)
(reviewing proposals to require active participation of judges to mitigate challenges
faced by pro se litigants).
305
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that applied to pleadings submitted by represented parties. And the
Court’s most recent procedural due process ruling held that judges
must take on new roles and responsibilities in order to protect the due
process rights of unrepresented parties in particular situations.
In Turner v. Rogers, decided at the close of the 2010 Term, the
Court, applying Mathews, rejected a claim that the Due Process Clause
automatically requires the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings for an indigent individual facing incarceration for failing to
308
pay child support to a child’s unrepresented custodian. In reaching
this holding, the Court explained that due process does not require a
categorical right to counsel as long as the state provides “‘substitute
procedural safeguards,’ which, if employed together, can significantly
309
In Turner,
reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”
these alternative procedures included giving the pro se defendant
more information about the “critical issue” to be decided at the hearing, using a form to collect information about that issue, giving the
defendant an opportunity to respond to questions about the issue at
the hearing, and requiring the judge to make an express finding on
310
Thus, the Court’s reasoning in Turner provides new supthat issue.
311
port for reconceptualizing the role of the judge at welfare hearings.

307

See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating that “a pro se
complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’” (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972))); cf. FED. R. EVID. 614 (enabling a court to call and interrogate witnesses); id.
706 (enabling court to appoint an expert of its own selection).
308
Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
309
Id. at 2519 (citation omitted) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)).
310
The Court identified the following four alternative procedural safeguards:
(1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant
financial information from him; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to respond to statements and questions about his financial status (e.g.,
those triggered by his responses on the form); and (4) an express finding by
the court that the defendant has the ability to pay.
Id. (citation omitted).
311
Turner’s reliance on judges to assure that individuals’ due process rights are
vindicated has prompted skepticism. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A
Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 78, 159-61 (2011) (observing that “the Turner rule is oddly incomplete” because
“enforcement depends on and returns contemnors to the very judges who dealt with
them too hastily”).
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C. Reckoning with the Limits of Procedural Due Process
Even if welfare agencies were to implement each of the procedural
innovations discussed above, the possibility remains that the resulting
procedural safeguards would fail to prevent erroneous deprivations of
benefits in the majority of cases. In other words, there might be no
way to supplement the welfare fair hearing right in a way that effectively
roots out erroneous deprivations. If that is the case, then it seems that
the focus of procedural due process should shift to an earlier stage in
the welfare termination process in order to prevent erroneous deprivations before they are even proposed.
To be sure, procedural due process is not usually concerned with
the initial decision to deprive an individual of a constitutionally protected interest. This is based on the assumption that meaningful procedures exist for individuals to defend themselves against erroneous
deprivations. But when no such procedures exist, as may turn out to
be true in the current welfare context, due process arguably requires
more. Goldberg itself lent support to such an expansive vision of due
process when it emphasized that due process procedures must be “tai312
As
lored to the capacities and circumstances” of welfare recipients.
Jerry Mashaw has argued, “The logical and limited extension of that
principle is that when due process cannot be assured by trial-type hearings, additional or different techniques for assuring fairness become
313
appropriate.”
What such alternative techniques might look like could vary considerably. To address the types of technology-driven errors that arise
in highly automated systems, Danielle Citron has suggested that due
314
process should require agencies to regularly test a system’s software.
Addressing caseworker errors would not be so straightforward. The
procedural due process scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s is instructive on this point. Only a few years after Goldberg was decided, scholars
began to argue that adversarial, trial-like procedural safeguards would
never be effective, especially for beneficiaries of subsistence programs

312

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
Mashaw, supra note 100, at 810.
314
See Citron, supra note 234, at 1310 (“Agencies should maintain testing suites that
run expected and unexpected hypothetical scenarios designed by independent policy
experts through decision systems to expose distorted policy. . . . Testing protocols
should be run before a system’s launch, during implementation, and every time
policies change.”).
313
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315

such as welfare.
According to Jerry Mashaw, writing in 1974, what
was needed was a management system for assuring accurate and timely
processing and adjudication of welfare claims, sometimes called a
316
quality control or quality assurance system. For Joel Handler, writing
twelve years later, the answer was an informal, cooperative system that
317
would exist side by side with the traditional due process system.
Both of these approaches represent major shifts in our understanding
of procedural due process. Depending on whether and how the
requirements of due process adapt to the facts and circumstances of
today’s welfare programs and welfare recipients, as well as the success
of such adaptation, it might be time to reconsider these approaches to
procedural due process.
CONCLUSION
Change is inescapable and, in the context of procedural due process, change matters. By examining the evolution of welfare during
the forty years since the Supreme Court announced the right to a fair
hearing in Goldberg v. Kelly, this Article has shown how changes in the
facts and circumstances of a property deprivation can affect the
Court’s fact-intensive approach to procedural due process. Such
changes are not unique to welfare—the facts and circumstances of
many of the procedural safeguards established since the due process
revolution will evolve in ways that affect one or more of the Mathews
factors in the years to come, if they have not already done so. Yet the
Supreme Court has not addressed whether and how due process can

315

See HANDLER, supra note 70, at 7, 22 (arguing that procedural due process is
“conceptually flawed” and that “reliance on the complaining client is virtually fatal”);
Mashaw, supra note 100, at 775 (arguing that “the elements of fairness or fair
procedure normally associated with due process of law in adjudicatory proceedings are
inadequate to produce fairness in social welfare claims adjudications”).
316
Mashaw, supra note 100, at 810-11. Since Mashaw made this proposal, quality
assurance systems have been adopted for the administration of food stamps, Social
Security disability benefits, and veterans’ benefits, among others. See, e.g., Casey &
Mannix, supra note 142, at 1383-87 (discussing the design and harmful effects of public
benefit quality control systems used in the 1980s). More recently, states have
experimented with new forms of diagnostic monitoring intended to improve agency
performance by combining features of case-by-case adjudication with systemic review.
See, e.g., Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State:
Lessons from Child Welfare Reforms, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 542-48 (2009)
(describing Alabama’s and Utah’s use of a “Quality Service Review” process to monitor
child protective services programs).
317
See HANDLER, supra note 70, at 143-53.
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adapt to these types of changes. This Article attempts to fill the gap by
arguing that adapting the requirements of due process to new facts
and circumstances is faithful to constitutional doctrine and necessary
to ensure that existing procedural systems continue to provide due
process of law. Adapting due process protections to our rapidly changing world also provides an opportunity, decades after the due process
revolution, to restart a conversation about procedural justice that went
silent many years ago.

